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History of the Kuril Islands. Kuril Islands in the history of Russian-Japanese relations. History of the Kuril problem

History of the Kuril Islands

Background

Briefly, the history of “belonging” to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island is as follows.

1.During the period 1639-1649. Russian Cossack detachments led by Moskovitinov, Kolobov, Popov explored and began to develop Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. At the same time, Russian pioneers repeatedly sailed to the island of Hokkaido, where they were peacefully greeted by the local Ainu aborigines. The Japanese appeared on this island a century later, after which they exterminated and partially assimilated the Ainu.

2.B 1701 Cossack sergeant Vladimir Atlasov reported to Peter I about the “subordination” of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, leading to the “wonderful kingdom of Nipon”, to the Russian crown.

3.B 1786. By order of Catherine II, a register of Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean was made, with the register being brought to the attention of all European states as a declaration of Russia's rights to these possessions, including Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

4.B 1792. By decree of Catherine II, the entire chain of the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as the island of Sakhalin officially included in the Russian Empire.

5. As a result of Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War 1854-1855 gg. under pressure England and France Russia forced was concluded with Japan on February 7, 1855. Treaty of Shimoda, according to which four southern islands of the Kuril chain were transferred to Japan: Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup. Sakhalin remained undivided between Russia and Japan. At the same time, however, the right of Russian ships to enter Japanese ports was recognized, and “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Japan and Russia” were proclaimed.

6.May 7, 1875 according to the Treaty of St. Petersburg, the tsarist government as a very strange act of “goodwill” makes incomprehensible further territorial concessions to Japan and transfers to it another 18 small islands of the archipelago. In return, Japan finally recognized Russia's right to all of Sakhalin. It is for this agreement the Japanese refer most of all today, slyly keeping silent, that the first article of this treaty reads: “... and henceforth eternal peace and friendship will be established between Russia and Japan” ( the Japanese themselves violated this treaty several times in the 20th century). Many Russian statesmen of those years sharply condemned this “exchange” agreement as short-sighted and harmful to the future of Russia, comparing it with the same short-sightedness as the sale of Alaska to the United States of America in 1867 for next to nothing ($7 billion 200 million). ), - saying that “now we are biting our own elbows.”

7.After the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 gg. followed another stage in the humiliation of Russia. By Portsmouth peace treaty concluded on September 5, 1905, Japan received the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, and also took away from Russia the lease right to the naval bases of Port Arthur and Dalniy. When did Russian diplomats remind the Japanese that all these provisions contradict the treaty of 1875 g., - those answered arrogantly and impudently : « War crosses out all agreements. You have been defeated and let's proceed from the current situation " Reader, Let us remember this boastful declaration of the invader!

8.Next comes the time to punish the aggressor for his eternal greed and territorial expansion. Signed by Stalin and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference February 10, 1945 G. " Agreement on the Far East" provided: "... 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan subject to the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin, all the Kuril Islands, as well as the restoration of the lease of Port Arthur and Dalny(these built and equipped by the hands of Russian workers, soldiers and sailors back in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. naval bases were very convenient in their geographical location donated free of charge to “brotherly” China. But our fleet needed these bases so much in the 60-80s during the height of the Cold War and the intense combat service of the fleet in remote areas of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. We had to equip the Cam Ranh forward base in Vietnam from scratch for the fleet).

9.B July 1945 in accordance with Potsdam Declaration heads of victorious countries the following verdict was adopted regarding the future of Japan: “The sovereignty of Japan will be limited to four islands: Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and those that WE SPECIFY.” August 14, 1945 The Japanese government has publicly confirmed its acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and September 2 Japan unconditionally surrendered. Article 6 of the Instrument of Surrender states: “...the Japanese government and its successors will honestly implement the terms of the Potsdam Declaration , give such orders and take such actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Powers requires in order to implement this declaration...” January 29, 1946 The Commander-in-Chief, General MacArthur, in his Directive No. 677 DEMANDED: “The Kuril Islands, including Habomai and Shikotan, are excluded from the jurisdiction of Japan.” AND only after that Legal action was issued by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 2, 1946, which read: “All lands, subsoil and waters of Sakhalin and the Kul Islands are the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” Thus, the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern), as well as about. Sakhalin, legally And in accordance with international law were returned to Russia . This could put an end to the “problem” of the Southern Kuril Islands and stop all further disputes. But the story with the Kuril Islands continues.

10.After the end of the Second World War US occupied Japan and turned it into their military base in the Far East. In September 1951 The USA, Great Britain and a number of other states (49 in total) signed Treaty of San Francisco with Japan, prepared in violation of the Potsdam Agreements without the participation of the Soviet Union . Therefore, our government did not join the agreement. However, in Art. 2, Chapter II of this treaty is written in black and white: “ Japan renounces all rights and claims... to the Kuril Islands and that part of Sakhalin and the adjacent islands , over which Japan acquired sovereignty by the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.” However, even after this, the story with the Kuril Islands does not end.

11.19 October 1956 The government of the Soviet Union, following the principles of friendship with neighboring states, signed with the Japanese government joint declaration, according to which the state of war between the USSR and Japan ended and peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations were restored between them. When signing the Declaration as a gesture of goodwill and nothing more it was promised to transfer to Japan the two southernmost islands of Shikotan and Habomai, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the countries.

12.However The United States imposed a number of military agreements on Japan after 1956, replaced in 1960 by a single “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security”, according to which US troops remained on its territory, and thus the Japanese islands turned into a springboard for aggression against the Soviet Union. In connection with this situation, the Soviet government declared to Japan that it was impossible to transfer the promised two islands to it.. And the same statement emphasized that, according to the declaration of October 19, 1956, “peace, good neighborliness and friendly relations” were established between the countries. Therefore, an additional peace treaty may not be required.
Thus, the problem of the South Kuril Islands does not exist. It was decided a long time ago. AND de jure and de facto the islands belong to Russia . In this regard, it might be appropriate remind the Japanese of their arrogant statement in 1905 g., and also indicate that Japan was defeated in World War II and therefore has no rights to any territories, even to her ancestral lands, except those that were given to her by the victors.
AND to our Foreign Ministry just as harshly, or in a softer diplomatic form you should have stated this to the Japanese and put an end to it, PERMANENTLY stopping all negotiations and even conversations on this non-existent problem that degrades the dignity and authority of Russia.
And again the “territorial issue”

However, starting from 1991 city, meetings of the President are held repeatedly Yeltsin and members of the Russian government, diplomats with Japanese government circles, during which The Japanese side every time persistently raises the issue of “northern Japanese territories.”
Thus, in the Tokyo Declaration 1993 g., signed by the President of Russia and the Prime Minister of Japan, was again the “presence of a territorial issue” was recognized, and both sides promised to “make efforts” to resolve it. The question arises: could our diplomats really not know that such declarations should not be signed, because recognition of the existence of a “territorial issue” is contrary to the national interests of Russia (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “High Treason”)??

As for the peace treaty with Japan, it is de facto and de jure in accordance with the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of October 19, 1956. not really needed. The Japanese do not want to conclude an additional official peace treaty, and there is no need. He more needed in Japan, as the side that was defeated in the Second World War, rather than Russia.

A Russian citizens should know that the “problem” of the Southern Kuril Islands is just a fake , her exaggeration, periodic media hype around her and the litigiousness of the Japanese - there is consequence illegal Japan's claims in violation of its obligations to strictly comply with its recognized and signed international obligations. And Japan’s constant desire to reconsider the ownership of many territories in the Asia-Pacific region permeates Japanese politics throughout the twentieth century.

Why The Japanese, one might say, have their teeth in the Southern Kuril Islands and are trying to illegally take possession of them again? But because the economic and military-strategic importance of this region is extremely great for Japan, and even more so for Russia. This region of colossal seafood wealth(fish, living creatures, sea animals, vegetation, etc.), deposits of useful, including rare earth minerals, energy sources, mineral raw materials.

For example, January 29 this year. in the Vesti (RTR) program, short information slipped through: it was discovered on the island of Iturup large deposit of the rare earth metal Rhenium(the 75th element in the periodic table, and the only one in the world ).
Scientists allegedly calculated that to develop this deposit it would be enough to invest only 35 thousand dollars, but the profit from the extraction of this metal will allow us to bring all of Russia out of the crisis in 3-4 years. Apparently the Japanese know about this and that is why they are so persistently attacking the Russian government demanding that they give them the islands.

I must say that During the 50 years of ownership of the islands, the Japanese did not build or create anything major on them, except for light temporary buildings. Our border guards had to rebuild barracks and other buildings at outposts. The entire economic “development” of the islands, which the Japanese are shouting about to the whole world today, consisted in the predatory robbery of the islands' wealth . During the Japanese "development" from the islands seal rookeries and sea otter habitats have disappeared . Part of the livestock of these animals our Kuril residents have already restored .

Today, the economic situation of this entire island zone, as well as the whole of Russia, is difficult. Of course, significant measures are needed to support this region and care for Kuril residents. According to calculations by a group of State Duma deputies, it is possible to produce on the islands, as reported in the program “Parliamentary Hour” (RTR) on January 31 of this year, only fish products up to 2000 tons per year, with a net profit of about 3 billion dollars.
Militarily, the ridge of the Northern and Southern Kuriles with Sakhalin constitutes a complete closed infrastructure for the strategic defense of the Far East and the Pacific Fleet. They protect the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and turn it into an inland one. This is the area deployment and combat positions of our strategic submarines.

Without the Southern Kuril Islands we will have a hole in this defense. Control over the Kuril Islands ensures free access of the fleet to the ocean - after all, until 1945, our Pacific Fleet, starting in 1905, was practically locked in its bases in Primorye. Detection equipment on the islands provides long-range detection of air and surface enemies and the organization of anti-submarine defense of the approaches to the passages between the islands.

In conclusion, it is worth noting this feature in the relationship between the Russia-Japan-US triangle. It is the United States that confirms the “legality” of the islands’ ownership of Japan, against all odds international treaties signed by them .
If so, then our Foreign Ministry has every right, in response to the claims of the Japanese, to invite them to demand the return of Japan to its “southern territories” - the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands.
These archipelagos former colonies of Germany, captured by Japan in 1914. Japanese rule over these islands was sanctioned by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. After the defeat of Japan, all these archipelagos came under US control. So Why shouldn't Japan demand that the United States return the islands to it? Or do you lack the spirit?
As you can see, there is clear double standard in Japanese foreign policy.

And one more fact that clarifies the overall picture of the return of our Far Eastern territories in September 1945 and the military significance of this region. The Kuril operation of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and the Pacific Fleet (August 18 - September 1, 1945) provided for the liberation of all the Kuril Islands and the capture of Hokkaido.

The annexation of this island to Russia would have important operational and strategic significance, since it would ensure the complete enclosure of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk by our island territories: Kuril Islands - Hokkaido - Sakhalin. But Stalin canceled this part of the operation, saying that with the liberation of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, we had resolved all our territorial issues in the Far East. A we don't need someone else's land . In addition, the capture of Hokkaido will cost us a lot of blood, unnecessary losses of sailors and paratroopers in the very last days of the war.

Stalin here showed himself to be a real statesman, caring for the country and its soldiers, and not an invader who coveted foreign territories that were very accessible in that situation for seizure.
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Why are the Kuril Islands interesting and is it possible to organize a trip on your own? Who owns the Kuril Islands now: the essence of the Russia-Japan conflict.

The islands of the Sakhalin ridge, bordering Japan, are considered an eastern wonder of nature. We are, of course, talking about the Kuril Islands, whose history is as rich as its nature. To begin with, it is worth saying that the struggle for 56 islands located between Kamchatka and Hokkaido began from the moment of discovery.

Kuril Islands on the map of Russia

Kuril Islands - pages of history

Thus, at the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century, when Russian navigators mapped hitherto unexplored lands that turned out to be inhabited, the process of appropriating uninhabited territories began. At that time, the Kuril Islands were inhabited by a people called Ayans. The Russian authorities tried to attract these people into their citizenship by any means, not excluding force. As a result, the Ayans, together with their lands, nevertheless went over to the side of the Russian Empire in exchange for the abolition of taxes.

The situation did not suit the Japanese at all, who had their own plans for these territories. It was not possible to resolve the conflict through diplomatic methods. Eventually, according to a document dated 1855, the territory of the islands is considered undivided. The situation became clear only after the end of World War II, when the amazing territory with a harsh climate was transferred to official ownership.

According to the new world order, the Kuril Islands came into the possession of the Soviet Union, the victorious state. The Japanese, who fought on the side of the Nazis, had no chance.

Who really owns the Kuril Islands?

Despite the results of World War II, which secured the USSR's ownership of the Kuril Islands at the global level, Japan still claims the territory. Until now, a peace treaty has not been signed between the two countries.

What is happening currently - in 2019?

Having changed tactics, Japan is making a compromise and is currently challenging Russia's ownership of only PART of the Kuril Islands. These are Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai group. At first glance, this is a small part of the Kuril Islands, because there are only 56 units in the archipelago! One thing is confusing: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan are the only Kuril Islands where there is a permanent population (about 18 thousand people). They are located closest to the Japanese “border”.

The Japanese and world media, in turn, are throwing fuel into the furnace of the conflict, exaggerating the topic and convincing ordinary Japanese citizens that the Kuril Islands are vital to them and have been unfairly captured. When, by whom, at what moment - it doesn’t matter. The main thing is to create as many potential sources of conflict around one vast, but slightly unlucky country. What if you get lucky and the case works out somewhere?

Representatives of the Russian Federation, represented by the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remain calm. But they never tire of reminding us once again that we are talking about the territory of Russia, which rightfully belongs to it. Well, in the end, it doesn’t make a claim to Poland for Gdansk and Alsace and Lorraine 😉

Nature of the Kuril Islands

Not only the history of the development of the islands is interesting, but also their nature. In fact, each of the Kuril Islands is a volcano, and a good part of these volcanoes are currently active. It is thanks to their volcanic origin that the nature of the islands is so diverse, and the surrounding landscapes are a paradise for photographers and geologists.

Eruption of the Crimean volcano (Kuril Islands, Russia)

Local residents. Bears of the Kuril Islands.

On the Kuril Islands there are many geothermal springs that form entire lakes with hot water saturated with micro- and macroelements beneficial to health. The Kuril Islands are home to a huge number of animals and birds, many of which are found only in these parts. The flora is also rich, mostly represented by endemics.

Travel to the Kuril Islands 2019

According to its parameters, the territory of the Kuril Islands is ideal for travel. And even though the climate is harsh, there are almost no sunny days, high humidity and plenty of precipitation - weather deficiencies are covered a hundredfold by the beauty of nature and amazingly clean air. So if you are worried about the weather on the Kuril Islands, then you can survive it.

Japan to the South Kuril Islands, but not everyone knows in detail the history of the Kuril Islands and their role in Russian-Japanese relations. This is what this article will focus on.

Before moving on to the history of the issue, it is worth telling why the South Kuril Islands are so important for Russia.

1. Strategic location. It is in the ice-free deep-sea straits between the South Kuril islands that submarines can enter the Pacific Ocean underwater at any time of the year.

2. Iturup has the world's largest deposit of the rare metal rhenium, which is used in superalloys for space and aviation technology. World production of rhenium in 2006 amounted to 40 tons, while the Kudryavy volcano releases 20 tons of rhenium every year. This is the only place in the world where rhenium is found in pure form and not in the form of impurities. 1 kg of rhenium, depending on purity, costs from 1000 to 10 thousand dollars. There is no other rhenium deposit in Russia (in Soviet times, rhenium was mined in Kazakhstan).

3. Reserves of other mineral resources of the Southern Kuril Islands are: hydrocarbons - about 2 billion tons, gold and silver - 2 thousand tons, titanium - 40 million tons, iron - 270 million tons

4. The Southern Kuril Islands are one of 10 places in the world where, due to water turbulence due to the meeting of warm and cold sea currents, food for fish rises from the seabed. This attracts huge schools of fish. The value of seafood produced here exceeds $4 billion a year.

The Kuril Islands are a chain of volcanic islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula (Russia) and the island of Hokkaido (Japan). The area is about 15.6 thousand km2.

The Kuril Islands consist of two ridges - the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril (Habomai). A large ridge separates the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean.

The Great Kuril Ridge is 1,200 km long and stretches from the Kamchatka Peninsula (in the north) to the Japanese island of Hokkaido (in the south). It includes more than 30 islands, of which the largest are: Paramushir, Simushir, Urup, Iturup and Kunashir. The southern islands have forests, while the northern ones are covered with tundra vegetation.

The Lesser Kuril Ridge is only 120 km long and extends from the island of Hokkaido (in the south) to the northeast. Consists of six small islands.

The Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin region (Russian Federation). They are divided into three regions: North Kuril, Kuril and South Kuril. The centers of these areas have corresponding names: Severo-Kurilsk, Kurilsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk. There is also the village of Malo-Kurilsk (the center of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The relief of the islands is predominantly mountainous and volcanic (there are 160 volcanoes, of which about 39 are active). The prevailing heights are 500-1000m. An exception is the island of Shikotan, which is characterized by low-mountain terrain formed as a result of the destruction of ancient volcanoes. The highest peak of the Kuril Islands is the Alaid volcano - 2339 meters, and the depth of the Kuril-Kamchatka depression reaches 10339 meters. High seismicity causes constant threats of earthquakes and tsunamis.

Population – 76.6% Russians, 12.8% Ukrainians, 2.6% Belarusians, 8% other nationalities. The permanent population of the islands lives mainly on the southern islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the northern ones - Paramushir, Shumshu. The basis of the economy is the fishing industry, because The main natural wealth is marine bioresources. Agriculture did not receive significant development due to unfavorable natural conditions.

On the Kuril Islands, deposits of titanium-magnetites, sands, ore occurrences of copper, lead, zinc and the rare elements contained in them, indium, helium, thallium, have been discovered, there are signs of platinum, mercury and other metals. Large reserves of sulfur ores with a fairly high sulfur content have been discovered.

Transport connections are carried out by sea and air. In winter, regular shipping ceases. Due to difficult weather conditions, flights are not regular (especially in winter).

Discovery of the Kuril Islands

During the Middle Ages, Japan had little contact with other countries of the world. As V. Shishchenko notes: “In 1639, a “policy of self-isolation” was announced. On pain of death, the Japanese were forbidden to leave the islands. The construction of large ships was prohibited. Foreign ships were almost not allowed into the ports.” Therefore, the organized development of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands by the Japanese began only at the end of the 18th century.

V. Shishchenko further writes: “For Russia, Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin is deservedly considered the discoverer of the Far East. In 1638-1639, led by Moskvitin, a detachment of twenty Tomsk and eleven Irkutsk Cossacks left Yakutsk and made a difficult transition along the Aldan, Maya and Yudoma rivers, through the Dzhugdzhur ridge and further along the Ulya River, to the Sea of ​​​​Okhotsk. The first Russian villages (including Okhotsk) were founded here.”

Ivan Yuryevich Moskvitin

The next significant step in the development of the Far East was made by the even more famous Russian pioneer Vasily Danilovich Poyarkov, who, at the head of a detachment of 132 Cossacks, was the first to travel along the Amur - to its very mouth. Poyarkov, left Yakutsk in June 1643; at the end of the summer of 1644, Poyarkov’s detachment reached the Lower Amur and ended up in the lands of the Amur Nivkhs. At the beginning of September, the Cossacks saw the Amur estuary for the first time. From here the Russian people could also see the northwestern coast of Sakhalin, which they received the idea of ​​as a large island. Therefore, many historians consider Poyarkov to be the “discoverer of Sakhalin,” despite the fact that the expedition members did not even visit its shores.

Since then, the Amur has acquired great importance, not only as a “river of grain”, but also as a natural communication. After all, until the 20th century, the Amur was the main road from Siberia to Sakhalin. In the fall of 1655, a detachment of 600 Cossacks arrived in the Lower Amur, which at that time was considered a large military force.

The development of events steadily led to the fact that already in the second half of the 17th century the Russian people could fully gain a foothold on Sakhalin. This was prevented by a new twist in history. In 1652, a Manchu-Chinese army arrived at the mouth of the Amur.

Being at war with Poland, the Russian state could not allocate the required number of people and funds to successfully counteract Qing China. Attempts to extract any benefits for Russia through diplomacy did not bring success. In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded between the two powers. For more than a century and a half, the Cossacks had to leave the Amur, which practically made Sakhalin inaccessible to them.

For China, the fact of the “first discovery” of Sakhalin does not exist, most likely for the simple reason that the Chinese knew about the island for a very long time, so long ago that they do not remember when they first learned about it.

Here, of course, the question arises: why didn’t the Chinese take advantage of such a favorable situation and colonize Primorye, Amur Region, Sakhalin and other territories? V. Shishchenkov answers this question: “The fact is that until 1878, Chinese women were prohibited from crossing the Great Wall of China! And in the absence of “their fair half,” the Chinese could not firmly establish themselves in these lands. They appeared in the Amur region only to collect yasak from the local peoples.”

With the conclusion of the Nerchinsk Peace, the sea route remained the most convenient road to Sakhalin for the Russian people. After Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnev made his famous voyage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific in 1648, the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean became regular.

In 1711-1713 D.N. Antsiferov and I.P. Kozyrevsky made expeditions to the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, during which they obtained detailed information about most of the Kuril Islands and the island of Hokkaido. In 1721, surveyors I.M. Evreinov and F.F. Luzhin carried out, by order of Peter I, a survey of the northern part of the Great Kuril Ridge to the island of Simushir and compiled a detailed map of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands.

In the 18th century there was a rapid development of the Kuril Islands by Russian people.

"Thus,– notes V. Shishchenko, – By the middle of the 18th century, an amazing situation had developed. Sailors from different countries literally plowed the ocean length and breadth. And the Great Wall, the Japanese “policy of self-isolation” and the inhospitable Sea of ​​Okhotsk formed a truly fantastic circle around Sakhalin, which left the island beyond the reach of both European and Asian explorers.”

At this time, the first clashes between the Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in the Kuril Islands took place. In the first half of the 18th century, Russian people actively developed the Kuril Islands. Back in 1738-1739, during the Spanberg expedition, the Middle and Southern Kuriles were discovered and described, and even a landing was made on Hokkaido. At that time, the Russian state was not yet able to take control of the islands, which were so far from the capital, which contributed to the abuses of the Cossacks against the aborigines, which sometimes amounted to robbery and cruelty.

In 1779, by her highest command, Catherine II freed the “shaggy Kurilians” from all fees and forbade encroaching on their territory. The Cossacks were unable to maintain their power without force, and they abandoned the islands south of Urup. In 1792, by order of Catherine II, the first official mission took place with the aim of establishing trade relations with Japan. This concession was used by the Japanese to stall for time and strengthen their position in the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin.

In 1798, a large Japanese expedition to the island of Iturup took place, led by Mogami Tokunai and Kondo Juzo. The expedition had not only research goals, but also political ones - Russian crosses were demolished and pillars were installed with the inscription: “Dainihon Erotofu” (Iturup - possession of Japan). The following year, Takadaya Kahee opens the sea route to Iturup, and Kondo Juzo visits Kunashir.

In 1801, the Japanese reached Urup, where they set up their pillars and ordered the Russians to leave their settlements.

Thus, by the end of the 18th century, Europeans’ ideas about Sakhalin remained very unclear, and the situation around the island created the most favorable conditions in favor of Japan.

Kuril Islands in the 19th century

In the 18th - early 19th centuries, the Kuril Islands were studied by Russian researchers D. Ya. Antsiferov, I. P. Kozyrevsky, I. F. Kruzenshtern.

Japan's attempts to seize the Kuril Islands by force provoked protests from the Russian government. N.P., who arrived in Japan in 1805 to establish trade relations. Rezanov, told the Japanese that “...to the north of Matsmaya (Hokkaido) all lands and waters belong to the Russian emperor and that the Japanese should not expand their possessions further.”

However, the aggressive actions of the Japanese continued. At the same time, in addition to the Kuril Islands, they began to lay claim to Sakhalin, making attempts to destroy signs on the southern part of the island indicating that this territory belongs to Russia.

In 1853, the representative of the Russian government, Adjutant General E.V. Putyatin negotiated a trade agreement.

Along with the task of establishing diplomatic and trade relations, Putyatin’s mission was supposed to formalize the border between Russia and Japan with an agreement.

Professor S.G. Pushkarev writes: “During the reign of Alexander II, Russia acquired significant expanses of land in the Far East. In exchange for the Kuril Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island was acquired from Japan.”

After the Crimean War in 1855, Putyatin signed the Treaty of Shimoda, which established that “the borders between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands of Iturup and Urup,” and Sakhalin was declared “undivided” between Russia and Japan. As a result, the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup went to Japan. This concession was stipulated by Japan's consent to trade with Russia, which, however, developed sluggishly even after that.

N.I. Tsimbaev characterizes the state of affairs in the Far East at the end of the 19th century: “Bilateral agreements signed with China and Japan during the reign of Alexander II for a long time determined Russia’s policy in the Far East, which was cautious and balanced.”

In 1875, the tsarist government of Alexander II made another concession to Japan - the so-called St. Petersburg Treaty was signed, according to which all the Kuril Islands up to Kamchatka, in exchange for recognition of Sakhalin as Russian territory, passed to Japan. (See Appendix 1)

The fact of Japan's attack on Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. was a gross violation of the Shimoda Treaty, which proclaimed “permanent peace and sincere friendship between Russia and Japan.”

Results of the Russo-Japanese War

As already mentioned, Russia had extensive possessions in the Far East. These territories were extremely remote from the center of the country and were poorly involved in national economic turnover. “The changing situation, as noted by A.N. Bokhanov, was associated with the construction of the Siberian Railway, the construction of which began in 1891. It was planned to run through the southern regions of Siberia with access to the Pacific Ocean in Vladivostok. Its total length from Chelyabinsk in the Urals to the final destination was about 8 thousand kilometers. It was the longest railway line in the world."

By the beginning of the 20th century. The main hub of international contradictions for Russia was the Far East and the most important area was relations with Japan. The Russian government was aware of the possibility of a military clash, but did not strive for it. In 1902 and 1903 Intensive negotiations took place between St. Petersburg, Tokyo, London, Berlin and Paris, which led to nothing.

On the night of January 27, 1904, 10 Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked the Russian squadron on the outer roadstead of Port Arthur and disabled 2 battleships and 1 cruiser. The next day, 6 Japanese cruisers and 8 destroyers attacked the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreets in the Korean port of Chemulpo. Only on January 28 did Japan declare war on Russia. Japan's treachery caused a storm of indignation in Russia.

A war was forced on Russia that it did not want. The war lasted a year and a half and turned out to be inglorious for the country. The reasons for general failures and specific military defeats were caused by various factors, but the main ones included:

  • incomplete military-strategic training of the armed forces;
  • the significant distance of the theater of military operations from the main centers of the army and control;
  • extremely limited communication network.

The futility of the war was clearly evident by the end of 1904, and after the fall of the Port Arthur fortress on December 20, 1904, few people in Russia believed in a favorable outcome of the campaign. The initial patriotic uplift gave way to despondency and irritation.

A.N. Bokhanov writes: “The authorities were in a state of stupor; no one could have imagined that the war, which according to all preliminary assumptions should have been short, dragged on for so long and turned out to be so unsuccessful. Emperor Nicholas II for a long time did not agree to admit the Far Eastern failure, believing that these were only temporary setbacks and that Russia should mobilize its efforts to strike Japan and restore the prestige of the army and the country. He undoubtedly wanted peace, but an honorable peace, one that could only be ensured by a strong geopolitical position, and this was seriously shaken by military failures.”

By the end of the spring of 1905, it became obvious that a change in the military situation was possible only in the distant future, and in the near future it was necessary to immediately begin a peaceful resolution of the conflict that had arisen. This was forced not only by military-strategic considerations, but, to an even greater extent, by the complications of the internal situation in Russia.

N.I. Tsimbaev states: “Japan’s military victories turned it into a leading Far Eastern power, supported by the governments of England and the United States.”

The situation for the Russian side was complicated not only by military-strategic defeats in the Far East, but also by the lack of previously worked out conditions for a possible agreement with Japan.

Having received the appropriate instructions from the sovereign, S.Yu. On July 6, 1905, Witte, together with a group of experts on Far Eastern affairs, went to the United States, to the city of Portsmouth, where negotiations were planned. The head of the delegation only received instructions not to agree under any circumstances to any form of payment of indemnity, which Russia had never paid in its history, and not to cede “not an inch of Russian land,” although by that time Japan had already occupied the southern part of Sakhalin Island.

Japan initially took a tough position in Portsmouth, demanding in the form of an ultimatum that Russia completely withdraw from Korea and Manchuria, transfer the Russian Far Eastern fleet, pay indemnity and consent to the annexation of Sakhalin.

The negotiations were on the verge of breakdown several times, and only thanks to the efforts of the head of the Russian delegation it was possible to achieve a positive result: on August 23, 1905. the parties entered into an agreement.

In accordance with it, Russia ceded lease rights to Japan in the territories in Southern Manchuria, parts of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel, and recognized Korea as a sphere of Japanese interests. A.N. Bokhanov speaks about the negotiations as follows: “The Portsmouth agreements became an undoubted success for Russia and its diplomacy. They looked in many ways like an agreement between equal partners, rather than a treaty concluded after an unsuccessful war.”

Thus, after the defeat of Russia, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty was concluded in 1905. The Japanese side demanded Sakhalin Island from Russia as an indemnity. The Treaty of Portsmouth terminated the 1875 exchange agreement and also stated that all Japanese trade agreements with Russia would be nullified as a result of the war.

This treaty annulled the Shimoda Treaty of 1855.

However, treaties between Japan and the newly created USSR existed back in the 20s. Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “In April 1920, the Far Eastern Republic (FER) was created - a temporary revolutionary democratic state, a “buffer” between the RSFSR and Japan. People's Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Far Eastern Republic under the command of V.K. Blucher, then I.P. Uborevich in October 1922 liberated the region from Japanese and White Guard troops. On October 25, NRA units entered Vladivostok. In November 1922, the “buffer” republic was abolished, its territory (with the exception of Northern Sakhalin, from where the Japanese left in May 1925) became part of the RSFSR.”

By the time of the conclusion of the convention on the basic principles of relations between Russia and Japan on January 20, 1925, there was in fact no existing bilateral agreement on the ownership of the Kuril Islands.

In January 1925, the USSR established diplomatic and consular relations with Japan (Beijing Convention). The Japanese government evacuated its troops from Northern Sakhalin, captured during the Russo-Japanese War. The Soviet government granted Japan concessions in the north of the island, in particular for the exploitation of 50% of the area of ​​oil fields.

War with Japan in 1945 and the Yalta Conference

Yu.Ya. Tereshchenko writes: “...a special period of the Great Patriotic War was the war of the USSR with militaristic Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945). On April 5, 1945, the Soviet government denounced the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, signed in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On August 9, fulfilling its allied obligations assumed at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan...During the 24-day military campaign there was The million-strong Kwantung Army, which was located in Manchuria, was defeated. The defeat of this army became the determining factor in the defeat of Japan.

It led to the defeat of the Japanese armed forces and to their heaviest losses. They amounted to 677 thousand soldiers and officers, incl. 84 thousand killed and wounded, more than 590 thousand prisoners. Japan lost its largest military-industrial base on the Asian mainland and its most powerful army. Soviet troops expelled the Japanese from Manchuria and Korea, from Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japan lost all the military bases and bridgeheads that it was preparing against the USSR. She was unable to conduct an armed struggle.”

At the Yalta Conference, the “Declaration of a Liberated Europe” was adopted, which, among other points, indicated the transfer to the Soviet Union of the South Kuril Islands, which were part of the Japanese “northern territories” (the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, Habomai).

In the first years after the end of World War II, Japan did not make territorial claims to the Soviet Union. Putting forward such demands was excluded then, if only because the Soviet Union, along with the United States and other Allied Powers, took part in the occupation of Japan, and Japan, as a country that agreed to unconditional surrender, was obliged to implement all decisions made by the Allied Powers, including decisions concerning its borders. It was during that period that new borders between Japan and the USSR were formed.

The transformation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands into an integral part of the Soviet Union was secured by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 2, 1946. In 1947, according to changes made to the Constitution of the USSR, the Kuril Islands were included in the South Sakhalin region of the RSFSR. The most important international legal document recording Japan's renunciation of rights to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was the peace treaty signed in September 1951 at an international conference in San Francisco with the victorious powers.

In the text of this document, summing up the results of the Second World War, in paragraph “C” in Article 2 it was clearly written: “Japan renounces all rights, title and claims to the Kuril Islands and to that part of Sakhalin Island and the adjacent islands, sovereignty over which Japan acquired under the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."

However, already during the San Francisco Conference, the desire of Japanese government circles to question the legitimacy of the borders established between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of the defeat of Japanese militarism was revealed. At the conference itself, this desire did not find open support from other participants and, above all, from the Soviet delegation, as is clear from the text of the agreement given above.

However, in the future, Japanese politicians and diplomats did not abandon their intention to revise the Soviet-Japanese borders and, in particular, to return the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago to Japanese control: Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai (I.A. Latyshev explains that in Habomai actually consists of five small islands adjacent to one another). The confidence of Japanese diplomats in their ability to carry out such a revision of borders was associated with the behind-the-scenes and then open support for the mentioned territorial claims to our country that US government circles began to provide to Japan - support that clearly contradicted the spirit and letter of the Yalta agreements signed by the US President F. Roosevelt in February 1945.

Such an obvious refusal of US government circles from their obligations enshrined in the Yalta agreements, according to I.A. Latyshev, explained simply: “... in the context of the further intensification of the Cold War, in the face of the victory of the communist revolution in China and armed confrontation with the North Korean army on the Korean Peninsula, Washington began to consider Japan as its main military bridgehead in the Far East and, moreover, as its main ally in the struggle to maintain US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. And in order to tie this new ally more tightly to their political course, American politicians began to promise him political support in acquiring the southern Kuril Islands, although such support represented a departure of the United States from the above-mentioned international agreements designed to consolidate the borders established as a result of the Second World War.”

The Japanese initiators of territorial claims to the Soviet Union received many benefits from the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the San Francisco Conference to sign the text of the peace treaty along with other allied countries participating in the conference. This refusal was motivated by Moscow’s disagreement with the United States’ intention to use the treaty to maintain American military bases on Japanese territory. This decision of the Soviet delegation turned out to be short-sighted: it began to be used by Japanese diplomats to create the impression among the Japanese public that the absence of the Soviet Union’s signature on the peace treaty exempted Japan from complying with it.

In subsequent years, the leaders of the Japanese Foreign Ministry resorted to reasoning in their statements, the essence of which was that since representatives of the Soviet Union did not sign the text of the peace treaty, then the Soviet Union has no right to refer to this document, and the international community should not give consent to the ownership the Soviet Union, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, although Japan renounced these territories in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty.

At the same time, Japanese politicians also referred to the absence in the agreement of a mention of who would henceforth own these islands.

Another direction of Japanese diplomacy boiled down to the fact that “... Japan’s refusal of the Kuril Islands, recorded in the agreement, does not mean its refusal of the four southern islands of the Kuril archipelago on the grounds that Japan... does not consider these islands to be Kuril Islands. And that, when signing the agreement, the Japanese government considered the allegedly named four islands not as the Kuril Islands, but as lands adjacent to the coast of the Japanese island of Hokkaido.”

However, at the first glance at Japanese pre-war maps and directions, all the Kuril Islands, including the southernmost ones, were one administrative unit called “Chishima”.

I.A. Latyshev writes that the refusal of the Soviet delegation at the conference in San Francisco to sign, along with representatives of other allied countries, the text of a peace treaty with Japan was, as the subsequent course of events showed, a very unfortunate political miscalculation for the Soviet Union. The absence of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan began to contradict the national interests of both sides. That is why, four years after the San Francisco Conference, the governments of both countries expressed their readiness to enter into contact with each other to find ways to formally resolve their relations and conclude a bilateral peace treaty. This goal was pursued, as it initially seemed, by both sides in the Soviet-Japanese negotiations that began in London in June 1955 at the level of ambassadors of both countries.

However, as it turned out during the negotiations that began, the main task of the then Japanese government was to use the Soviet Union’s interest in normalizing relations with Japan in order to achieve territorial concessions from Moscow. In essence, it was about the open refusal of the Japanese government from the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the part where the northern borders of Japan were determined.

From this moment, as I.A. writes. Latyshev, the most ill-fated territorial dispute between the two countries, detrimental to Soviet-Japanese good neighborliness, began, which continues to this day. It was in May-June 1955 that Japanese government circles took the path of illegal territorial claims against the Soviet Union, aimed at revising the borders established between both countries as a result of World War II.

What prompted the Japanese side to take this path? There were several reasons for this.

One of them is the long-standing interest of Japanese fishing companies in gaining control of the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands. It is well known that the coastal waters of the Kuril Islands are the richest region of the Pacific Ocean in fish resources, as well as other seafood. Fishing for salmon, crabs, seaweed and other expensive seafood could provide Japanese fishing and other companies with fabulous profits, which prompted these circles to put pressure on the government in order to get these richest marine fishing areas entirely for themselves.

Another motivating reason for the attempts of Japanese diplomacy to return the southern Kuril Islands under its control was the Japanese understanding of the exceptional strategic importance of the Kuril Islands: whoever owns the islands actually holds in his hands the keys to the gates leading from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

Thirdly, by putting forward territorial demands on the Soviet Union, Japanese government circles hoped to revive nationalist sentiments among broad sections of the Japanese population and use nationalist slogans to unite these sections under their ideological control.

And finally, fourthly, another important point was the desire of the Japanese ruling circles to please the United States. After all, the territorial demands of the Japanese authorities fit well into the belligerent course of the US government, which was directed sharply against the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries. And it is no coincidence that US Secretary of State D. F. Dulles, as well as other influential US political figures, already during the London Soviet-Japanese negotiations began to support Japanese territorial claims, despite the fact that these claims obviously contradicted the decisions of the Yalta Conference of the Allied Powers.

As for the Soviet side, Japan’s advance of territorial demands was viewed by Moscow as an encroachment on the state interests of the Soviet Union, as an illegal attempt to revise the borders established between both countries as a result of the Second World War. Therefore, Japanese demands could not but meet with resistance from the Soviet Union, although its leaders in those years sought to establish good neighborly contacts and business cooperation with Japan.

Territorial dispute during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev

During the Soviet-Japanese negotiations of 1955-1956 (in 1956, these negotiations were moved from London to Moscow), Japanese diplomats, having encountered a firm rebuff to their claims to South Sakhalin and all the Kuril Islands, began to quickly moderate these claims. In the summer of 1956, the territorial harassment of the Japanese came down to the demand for the transfer to Japan only of the southern Kuril Islands, namely the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan and Habomai, which represented the most favorable part of the Kuril archipelago for life and economic development.

On the other hand, at the very first stages of the negotiations, the short-sightedness in the approach to Japanese claims of the then Soviet leadership, which sought to speed up the normalization of relations with Japan at any cost, was revealed. Without a clear idea of ​​the southern Kuril Islands, much less their economic and strategic value, N.S. Khrushchev, apparently, treated them as small bargaining chips. Only this can explain the naive judgment among the Soviet leader that negotiations with Japan could be successfully completed if only the Soviet side made a “small concession” to Japanese demands. In those days N.S. Khrushchev imagined that, imbued with gratitude for the “gentlemanly” gesture of the Soviet leadership, the Japanese side would respond with the same “gentlemanly” compliance, namely: it would withdraw its excessive territorial claims, and the dispute would end with an “amicable agreement” to the mutual satisfaction of both parties.

Guided by this erroneous calculation of the Kremlin leader, the Soviet delegation at the negotiations, unexpectedly for the Japanese, expressed its readiness to cede to Japan the two southern islands of the Kuril chain: Shikotan and Habomai, after the Japanese side signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Having willingly accepted this concession, the Japanese side did not calm down, and for a long time continued to persistently seek the transfer of all four South Kuril islands to it. But she was unable to negotiate big concessions then.

Khrushchev's irresponsible "gesture of friendship" was recorded in the text of the "Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations", signed by the heads of government of both countries in Moscow on October 19, 1956. In particular, in Article 9 of this document it was written that the Soviet Union and Japan “...agreed to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations on concluding a peace treaty. At the same time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting the wishes of Japan and taking into account the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the fact that the actual transfer of these islands to Japan will be made after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan." .

The future transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan was interpreted by the Soviet leadership as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's readiness to give up part of its territory in the name of good ties with Japan. It is no coincidence, as it was emphasized more than once later, that the article dealt with the “transfer” of these islands to Japan, and not about their “return,” as the Japanese side was then inclined to interpret the essence of the matter.

The word “transfer” was intended to mean the intention of the Soviet Union to cede part of its territory to Japan, and not Japanese territory.

However, the inclusion in the declaration of Khrushchev’s reckless promise to present Japan with an advance “gift” in the form of part of Soviet territory was an example of the political thoughtlessness of the then Kremlin leadership, which had neither the legal nor the moral right to turn the country’s territory into a subject of diplomatic bargaining. The short-sightedness of this promise became obvious over the next two or three years, when the Japanese government in its foreign policy set a course for strengthening military cooperation with the United States and increasing Japan’s independent role in the Japanese-American “security treaty”, the spearhead of which was quite definitely directed towards Soviet Union.

The hopes of the Soviet leadership that its willingness to “hand over” two islands to Japan would prompt Japanese government circles to renounce further territorial claims to our country were also not justified.

The very first months that passed after the signing of the joint declaration showed that the Japanese side did not intend to calm down in its demands.

Soon, Japan had a new “argument” in the territorial dispute with the Soviet Union, based on a distorted interpretation of the content of the said declaration and the text of its ninth article. The essence of this “argument” was that the normalization of Japanese-Soviet relations does not end, but, on the contrary, presupposes further negotiations on the “territorial issue” and that the recording in the ninth article of the declaration of the Soviet Union’s readiness to transfer to Japan upon the conclusion of a peace treaty the islands of Habomai and Shikotan still does not draw an end to the territorial dispute between the two countries, but, on the contrary, suggests the continuation of this dispute over two other islands of the southern Kuril Islands: Kunashir and Iturup.

Moreover, at the end of the 50s, the Japanese government became more active than before in using the so-called “territorial issue” to fan unkind sentiments towards Russia among the Japanese population.

All this prompted the Soviet leadership, headed by N.S. Khrushchev, to make adjustments to his assessments of Japanese foreign policy, which did not meet the original spirit of the 1956 Joint Declaration. Shortly after the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the anti-Soviet “security treaty” on January 19, 1960 in Washington, namely on January 27, 1960, the USSR government sent a memorandum to the Japanese government.

The note stated that as a result of Japan’s conclusion of a military treaty, weakening the foundations of peace in the Far East, “... a new situation is emerging in which it is impossible to fulfill the promises of the Soviet government to transfer the islands of Habomai and Sikotan to Japan”; “By agreeing to transfer the indicated islands to Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty,” the note further stated, “the Soviet government met the wishes of Japan, took into account the national interests of the Japanese state and the peace-loving intentions expressed at that time by the Japanese government during the Soviet-Japanese negotiations.”

As was then indicated in the cited note, given the changed situation, when the new treaty is directed against the USSR, the Soviet government cannot help ensure that by transferring to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, which belong to the USSR, the territory used by foreign troops is expanded. By foreign troops, the note meant the US armed forces, whose indefinite presence on the Japanese islands was secured by a new “security treaty” signed by Japan in January 1960.

In the subsequent months of 1960, other notes and statements by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet government were published in the Soviet press, indicating the reluctance of the USSR leadership to continue fruitless negotiations regarding Japanese territorial claims. From that time on, for a long time, or more precisely, for more than 25 years, the position of the Soviet government regarding the territorial claims of Japan became extremely simple and clear: “there is no territorial issue in the relations between the two countries” because this issue has “already been resolved” by previous international agreements.

Japanese claims in 1960-1980

The firm and clear position of the Soviet side regarding Japanese territorial claims led to the fact that during the 60-80s, none of the Japanese statesmen and diplomats managed to draw the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its leaders into any extensive discussion about Japanese territorial claims .

But this did not mean at all that the Japanese side accepted the Soviet Union’s refusal to continue discussions on Japanese claims. In those years, the efforts of Japanese government circles were aimed at developing the so-called “movement for the return of the northern territories” in the country through various administrative measures.

It is noteworthy that the words “northern territories” acquired a very loose content during the development of this “movement”.

Some political groups, in particular government circles, meant by “northern territories” the four southern islands of the Kuril chain; others, including the socialist and communist parties of Japan - all the Kuril Islands, and still others, especially from among the adherents of far-right organizations, not only the Kuril Islands, but also South Sakhalin.

Beginning in 1969, the government map office and the Ministry of Education began publicly “correcting” maps and textbooks that began to color the southern Kuril Islands as Japanese territory, causing the Japanese territory to “grow” on these new maps, as the press reported. , 5 thousand square kilometers.

More and more efforts were used to process the country's public opinion and draw as many Japanese as possible into the “movement for the return of the northern territories.” For example, trips to the island of Hokkaido in the area of ​​the city of Nemuro, from where the southern Kuril Islands are clearly visible, began to be widely practiced by specialized groups of tourists from other parts of the country. The programs of these groups’ stay in the city of Nemuro included “walks” on ships along the borders of the southern islands of the Kuril chain with the aim of “sad contemplation” of the lands that once belonged to Japan. By the early 1980s, a significant proportion of the participants in these “nostalgic walks” were schoolchildren, for whom such voyages were counted as “study trips” provided for in school curricula. At Cape Nosapu, located closest to the borders of the Kuril Islands, with funds from the government and a number of public organizations, a whole complex of buildings intended for “pilgrims” was built, including a 90-meter observation tower and an “Archival Museum” with a tendentiously selected exhibition designed to convince uninformed visitors in the imaginary historical “validity” of Japanese claims to the Kuril Islands.

A new development in the 70s was the appeal of the Japanese organizers of the anti-Soviet campaign to the foreign public. The first example of this was the speech of Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the anniversary session of the UN General Assembly in October 1970, in which the head of the Japanese government tried to drag the world community into a territorial dispute with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, in the 70-80s, attempts by Japanese diplomats to use the UN rostrum for the same purpose were made repeatedly.

Since 1980, on the initiative of the Japanese government, the so-called “Northern Territories Days” began to be celebrated annually in the country. That day was February 7th. It was on this day in 1855 that a Russian-Japanese treaty was signed in the Japanese city of Shimoda, according to which the southern part of the Kuril Islands was in the hands of Japan, and the northern part remained with Russia.

The choice of this date as the “day of the northern territories” was meant to emphasize that the Treaty of Shimoda (annulled by Japan itself in 1905 as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1918-1925 during the Japanese intervention in the Far East and Siberia) allegedly still retains its significance.

Unfortunately, the position of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union regarding Japanese territorial claims began to lose its former firmness during the period that M.S. was in power. Gorbachev. In public statements, there were calls for a revision of the Yalta system of international relations that emerged as a result of World War II and for the immediate completion of the territorial dispute with Japan through a “fair compromise,” which meant concessions to Japanese territorial claims. The first frank statements of this kind were made in October 1989 from the lips of the people's deputy, rector of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute Yu. Afanasyev, who, during his stay in Tokyo, declared the need to break the Yalta system and speedily transfer to Japan the four southern islands of the Kuril chain.

Following Yu. Afanasyev, others began to speak out in favor of territorial concessions during trips to Japan: A. Sakharov, G. Popov, B. Yeltsin. In particular, the “Program for a Five-Stage Resolution of the Territorial Issue,” put forward by the then leader of the interregional group, Yeltsin, during his visit to Japan in January 1990, was nothing more than a course toward gradual, time-stretched concessions to Japanese territorial demands.

As I.A. Latyshev writes: “The result of long and intense negotiations between Gorbachev and Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in April 1991 was the “Joint Statement” signed by the leaders of the two countries. This statement reflected Gorbachev’s characteristic inconsistency in his views and in protecting the national interests of the state.

On the one hand, despite the persistent harassment of the Japanese, the Soviet leader did not allow the inclusion in the text of the “Joint Statement” of any language that openly confirmed the readiness of the Soviet side to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan. He also did not refuse the notes from the Soviet government sent to Japan in 1960.

However, on the other hand, the text of the “Joint Statement” nevertheless included rather ambiguous wording, which allowed the Japanese to interpret them in their favor.”

Evidence of Gorbachev's inconsistency and instability in protecting the national interests of the USSR was his statement about the intention of the Soviet leadership to begin reducing the ten thousand military contingent located on the disputed islands, despite the fact that these islands are adjacent to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, where four of the thirteen Japanese divisions were stationed "self-defense forces"

Democratic time of the 90s

The August 1991 events in Moscow, the transfer of power into the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters and the subsequent withdrawal of the three Baltic countries from the Soviet Union, and later the complete collapse of the Soviet state, which followed as a result of the Belovezhskaya agreements, were perceived by Japanese political strategists as evidence of a sharp weakening our country's ability to resist Japanese claims.

In September 1993, when the date of Yeltsin’s arrival in Japan, October 11, 1993, was finally agreed upon, the Tokyo press also began to direct the Japanese public to abandon excessive hopes for a quick resolution of the territorial dispute with Russia.

Events associated with Yeltsin’s continued tenure at the head of the Russian state, even more clearly than before, showed the inconsistency of the hopes of both Japanese politicians and Russian Foreign Ministry leaders for the possibility of a quick solution to the protracted dispute between the two countries through a “compromise” involving concessions of our country to the Japanese. territorial harassment.

Followed in 1994-1999. The discussions between Russian and Japanese diplomats did not, in fact, introduce anything new into the situation that arose at the Russian-Japanese negotiations on the territorial dispute.

In other words, the territorial dispute between the two countries reached a deep impasse in 1994-1999, and neither side could see a way out of this impasse. The Japanese side, apparently, did not intend to give up its unfounded territorial claims, because none of the Japanese statesmen was able to decide on such a step, which was fraught with inevitable political death for any Japanese politician. And any concessions to the Japanese claims of the Russian leadership became even less likely in the conditions of the balance of political forces that had developed in the Kremlin and beyond its walls than in previous years.

A clear confirmation of this was the increasing frequency of conflicts in the sea waters washing the southern Kuril Islands - conflicts during which, during 1994-1955, repeated unceremonious invasions of Japanese poachers into Russian territorial waters were met with harsh rebuff from Russian border guards, who opened fire on border violators.

I.A. speaks about the possibilities of resolving these relations. Latyshev: “Firstly, the Russian leadership should have immediately abandoned the illusion that as soon as Russia ceded the southern Kuril Islands to Japan, ... the Japanese side would immediately benefit our country with large investments, preferential loans, and scientific and technical information. It was precisely this misconception that prevailed in Yeltsin’s circle.”

“Secondly,” writes I.A. Latyshev, “our diplomats and politicians both in Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s times should have abandoned the false assumption that Japanese leaders could in the near future moderate their claims to the southern Kuril Islands and come to some kind of “reasonable compromise” in the territorial dispute with our country.

For many years, as discussed above, the Japanese side never showed, and was unable to show in the future, a desire to renounce its claims to all four southern Kuril Islands.” The maximum that the Japanese could agree to is to receive the four islands they demand not at the same time, but in installments: first two (Habomai and Shikotan), and then, after some time, two more (Kunashir and Iturup).

“Thirdly, for the same reason, the hopes of our politicians and diplomats for the possibility of persuading the Japanese to conclude a peace treaty with Russia, based on the “Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration on the Normalization of Relations” signed in 1956, were self-deception. It was a good delusion and nothing more.” The Japanese side sought from Russia an open and clear confirmation of the obligation written down in Article 9 of the said declaration to transfer to it the islands of Shikotan and Habomai upon the conclusion of a peace treaty. But this did not at all mean that the Japanese side was ready to end its territorial harassment of our country after such confirmation. Japanese diplomats considered establishing control over Shikotan and Habomai only as an intermediate stage on the way to taking possession of all four South Kuril islands.

Russia's national interests required in the second half of the 90s that Russian diplomats abandon the course of illusory hopes for the possibility of our concessions to Japanese territorial claims, and, on the contrary, instill in the Japanese side the idea of ​​​​the inviolability of Russia's post-war borders.

In the fall of 1996, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put forward a proposal for “joint economic development” by Russia and Japan of those very four islands of the Kuril archipelago that Japan so persistently claimed, which was nothing more than another concession to pressure from the Japanese side.

The allocation by the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the southern Kuril Islands to a certain special zone available for business activities of Japanese citizens was interpreted in Japan as an indirect recognition by the Russian side of the “validity” of Japanese claims to these islands.

I.A. Latyshev writes: “Another thing is annoying: in the Russian proposals, which envisaged wide access for Japanese entrepreneurs to the southern Kuril Islands, there was not even an attempt to condition this access on Japan’s consent to the corresponding benefits and free access of Russian entrepreneurs to the territory of the areas of the Japanese island of Hokkaido close to the southern Kuril Islands. And this demonstrated the lack of readiness of Russian diplomacy to achieve, in negotiations with the Japanese side, equal rights for the two countries in their business activities in each other’s territories. In other words, the idea of ​​“joint economic development” of the southern Kuril Islands turned out to be nothing more than a unilateral step by the Russian Foreign Ministry towards the Japanese desire to master these islands.”

The Japanese were allowed to conduct private fishing in the immediate vicinity of the shores of precisely those islands that Japan claimed and claims. At the same time, the Japanese side not only did not grant Russian fishing vessels similar rights to fish in Japanese territorial waters, but also did not undertake any obligations to ensure that its citizens and vessels comply with the laws and regulations of fishing in Russian waters.

Thus, ten years of attempts by Yeltsin and his entourage to resolve the Russian-Japanese territorial dispute on a “mutually acceptable basis” and sign a bilateral peace treaty between both countries did not lead to any tangible results.

To be continued, stay tuned...

In 2006, the Federal Target Program "Socio-economic Development of the Kuril Islands for 2007 - 2015" was adopted. The main goals of the program are to improve the standard of living of the population, solve energy and transport problems, develop fisheries and tourism. Currently, the volume of the federal target program is 21 billion rubles. The total funding for this program (including budgetary and non-budgetary sources) is almost 28 billion rubles. In the coming years, the main funds will be spent on the creation and development of a system of highways, airports and sea ports. The main attention will be paid to such facilities as Iturup Airport, the sea terminal on Kunashir Island, the cargo and passenger complex in Whale Bay on Iturup Island, etc. According to the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, since 2007, 18 facilities have been put into operation in the Kuril Islands, including including 3 kindergartens in Kunashir, a hospital with a clinic in Iturup, next in line is a hospital in Shikotan, as well as a number of housing and communal services facilities.

The Kuril Islands are a chain of islands between the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Japanese island of Hokkaido, separating the Sea of ​​Okhotsk from the Pacific Ocean. They are part of the Sakhalin region. Their length is about 1200 km. Total area - 10.5 thousand square meters. km. To the south of them lies the state border of the Russian Federation with Japan. The islands form two parallel ridges: the Greater Kuril and the Lesser Kuril. Includes 30 large and many small islands. They have important military-strategic and economic significance.

The territory of the North Kuril urban district includes the islands of the Great Kuril ridge: Atlasova, Shumshu, Paramushir, Antsiferova, Makanrushi, Onekotan, Kharimkotan, Chirinkotan, Ekarma, Shiashkotan, Raikoke, Matua, Rasshua, Ushishir, Ketoi and all the small islands located nearby. The administrative center is the city of Severo-Kurilsk.

The Southern Kuril Islands include the islands of Iturup, Kunashir (belonging to the Greater Kuril Ridge), Shikotan and the Habomai ridge (belonging to the Lesser Kuril Ridge). Their total area is about 8.6 thousand square meters. km.

Iturup, located between the islands of Kunashir and Urup, is the largest island in the Kuril archipelago by area. Area - 6725 sq. km. The population is about 6 thousand people. Administratively, Iturup is part of the Kuril urban district. The center is the city of Kurilsk. The island's economy is based on the fishing industry. In 2006, the most powerful fish factory in Russia, Reidovo, was launched on the island, processing 400 tons of fish per day. Iturup is the only place in Russia where a rhenium metal deposit has been discovered; gold deposits have been explored here since 2006. Burevestnik Airport is located on the island. In 2007, within the framework of the Federal Target Program, the construction of a new international airport, Iturup, began here, which will become the main air harbor in the Kuril Islands. The runway is currently being installed.

Kunashir is the southernmost of the Kuril Islands. Area - 1495.24 sq. km. The population is about 8 thousand people. The center is the urban-type settlement of Yuzhno-Kurilsk /population 6.6 thousand people/. It is part of the South Kuril urban district. The main industry is fish processing. The entire territory of the island is a border zone. Civil and military transportation on the island is carried out by Mendeleevo Airport. For several years, reconstruction was carried out there in order to improve air communication between Kunashir and the neighboring islands of the Kuril chain, Sakhalin and other Russian regions. On May 3, 2012, permission was received to put the airport into operation. The work was carried out in accordance with the Federal Target Program "Socio-economic development of the Kuril Islands / Sakhalin Region / for 2007-2015." As a result of the project, the airfield was reconstructed to accommodate An-24 aircraft, and the engineering support of the airport was brought to the requirements of the NGEA and FAP standards.

The only large formation of Russian armed forces on the islands of the Kuril ridge is stationed on Iturup and Kunashir - the 18th machine gun and artillery division.

On the islands of Kunashir and Iturup, under the influence of the Kuril volcanic zone, volcanoes of varying sizes stretch. Countless rivers, waterfalls, hot springs, lakes, meadows and bamboo thickets can be attractive for tourism development on the islands.

Shikotan is the largest island of the Malaya ridge of the Kuril Islands. Area - 225 sq. km. Population - more than 2 thousand people. Included in the South Kuril urban district. Administrative center - village. Malokurilskoe. There is a hydrophysical observatory on the island, and fishing and the extraction of marine animals are also developed here. Shikotan is partially located on the territory of the state nature reserve of federal significance "Little Kuriles". The island is separated by the South Kuril Strait from Kunashir Island.

Habomai is a group of islands that, together with the island of Shikotan, forms the Lesser Kuril chain. Habomai includes the islands of Polonsky, Oskolki, Zeleny, Tanfilyeva, Yuri, Demina, Anuchina and a number of small ones. Area - 100 sq. km. Included in the South Kuril urban district. The straits between the islands are shallow and filled with reefs and underwater rocks. There is no civilian population on the islands - only Russian border guards.

Illustration copyright RIA Image caption Before Putin and Abe, the issue of signing a peace treaty between Russia and Japan was discussed by all their predecessors - to no avail

During a two-day visit to Nagato and Tokyo, the Russian president will agree with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on investments. The main question - the ownership of the Kuril Islands - will, as usual, be postponed indefinitely, experts say.

Abe became the second G7 leader to host Putin after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The visit was supposed to take place two years ago, but was canceled due to sanctions against Russia, supported by Japan.

What is the essence of the dispute between Japan and Russia?

Abe is making progress in a long-standing territorial dispute in which Japan claims the islands of Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, as well as the Habomai archipelago (there is no such name in Russia; the archipelago and Shikotan are united under the name of the Lesser Kuril Ridge).

The Japanese elite understands perfectly well that Russia will never return the two large islands, so they are ready to take the maximum - two small ones. But how can we explain to society that they are abandoning large islands forever? Alexander Gabuev, expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center

At the end of World War II, in which Japan fought on the side of Nazi Germany, the USSR expelled 17 thousand Japanese from the islands; A peace treaty was never signed between Moscow and Tokyo.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and Japan established the sovereignty of the USSR over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but Tokyo and Moscow never agreed on what to mean by the Kuril Islands.

Tokyo considers Iturup, Kunashir and Habomai to be its illegally occupied “northern territories”. Moscow considers these islands part of the Kuril Islands and has repeatedly stated that their current status is not subject to revision.

In 2016, Shinzo Abe flew to Russia twice (to Sochi and Vladivostok), and he and Putin also met at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima.

In early December, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow and Tokyo have similar positions on the peace treaty. In an interview with Japanese journalists, Vladimir Putin called the lack of a peace treaty with Japan an anachronism that “must be eliminated.”

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption Migrants from the “northern territories” still live in Japan, as well as their descendants who do not mind returning to their historical homeland

He also said that the foreign ministries of the two countries need to resolve “purely technical issues” between themselves so that the Japanese have the opportunity to visit the southern Kuril Islands without visas.

However, Moscow is embarrassed that if the southern Kuril Islands are returned, US military bases may appear there. The head of the National Security Council of Japan, Shotaro Yachi, did not rule out this possibility in a conversation with Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, the Japanese newspaper Asahi wrote on Wednesday.

Should we wait for the Kuriles to return?

The short answer is no. “We should not expect any breakthrough agreements, or even ordinary ones, on the issue of ownership of the southern Kuril Islands,” says former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze.

“The expectations of the Japanese side, as usual, are at odds with Russia’s intentions,” Kunadze said in an interview with the BBC. “In the last days before leaving for Japan, President Putin repeatedly said that for Russia the problem of belonging to the Kuril Islands does not exist, that the Kuril Islands are , in essence, a military trophy following the results of the Second World War, and even that Russia’s rights to the Kuril Islands are secured by international treaties.”

The latter, according to Kunadze, is a controversial issue and depends on the interpretation of these treaties.

“Putin is referring to the agreements reached in Yalta in February 1945. These agreements were of a political nature and required appropriate legal formalization. It took place in San Francisco in 1951. The Soviet Union did not sign a peace treaty with Japan at that time. Therefore “, there is no other consolidation of Russia’s rights in the territories that Japan renounced under the San Francisco Treaty,” the diplomat sums up.

Illustration copyright Getty Images Image caption The Russians, like the Japanese, do not expect concessions from their authorities on the Kuril Islands

“The parties are trying to deflate the public’s mutual expectations as much as possible and show that a breakthrough will not happen,” comments Carnegie Moscow Center expert Alexander Gabuev.

“Russia’s red line: Japan recognizes the results of World War II, renounces claims to the southern Kuril Islands. As a gesture of goodwill, we are transferring two small islands to Japan, and on Kunashir and Iturup we can make visa-free entry, a free zone for joint economic development - everything that whatever," he believes. "Russia cannot give up two large islands, because it would be a loss, these islands are of economic importance, a lot of money has been invested there, there is a large population, the straits between these islands are used by Russian submarines when they go out to patrol the Pacific Ocean" .

Japan, according to Gabuev’s observations, has softened its position on the disputed territories in recent years.

“The Japanese elite understands perfectly well that Russia will never return two large islands, so they are ready to take a maximum of two small ones. But how can they explain to society that they are abandoning the large islands forever? Japan is looking for options in which it takes the small ones and retains its claim to large. For Russia this is unacceptable, we want to resolve the issue once and for all. These two red lines are not yet so close that a breakthrough can be expected,” the expert believes.

What else will be discussed?

The Kuril Islands are not the only topic that Putin and Abe discuss. Russia needs foreign investment in the Far East.

According to the Japanese publication Yomiuri, trade turnover between the two countries has decreased due to sanctions. Thus, imports from Russia to Japan decreased by 27.3% - from 2.61 trillion yen ($23 billion) in 2014 to 1.9 trillion yen ($17 billion) in 2015. And exports to Russia increased by 36.4% - from 972 billion yen ($8.8 billion) in 2014 to 618 billion yen ($5.6 billion) in 2015.

Illustration copyright RIA Image caption As head of the Russian state, Putin last visited Japan 11 years ago.

The Japanese government intends, through the state oil, gas and metals corporation JOGMEC, to acquire part of the gas fields of the Russian company Novatek, as well as part of the shares of Rosneft.

It is expected that dozens of commercial agreements will be signed during the visit, and the working breakfast of the Russian President and the Japanese Prime Minister will be attended, in particular, by the head of Rosatom Alexey Likhachev, the head of Gazprom Alexey Miller, the head of Rosneft Igor Sechin, the head of the Russian Direct Fund investments Kirill Dmitriev, entrepreneurs Oleg Deripaska and Leonid Mikhelson.

So far, Russia and Japan are only exchanging pleasantries. Based on whether at least part of the economic memoranda is implemented, it will become clear whether they can still agree on something.