Where was the economy of the USSR? GDP of the USSR and the USA: comparison. General conclusions on the gdp of the ussr and usa

During 1970-1990. The USSR's GDP in current prices increased by 357.5 billion dollars (by 82.5%) to 790.9 billion dollars; the change occurred by $81.7 billion due to a population increase of 45.7 million, as well as by $275.7 billion due to an increase in GDP per capita by $957.0. The average annual growth of the USSR's GDP is 17.9 billion dollars or 3.1%. The average annual growth of the USSR's GDP in constant prices is 4.7%. The world share decreased by 9.2%. The share in Europe decreased by 22.3%. The minimum GDP was in 1970 ($433.4 billion). The maximum GDP was in 1983 ($993.0 billion).

For the period 1970-1990. GDP per capita in the USSR increased by $957.0 (53.5%) to $2,745.0. The average annual growth of GDP per capita at current prices is $47.8 or 2.2%.

USSR GDP, 1970-1983 (growth)

For 1970-1983 The USSR's GDP at current prices increased by 559.6 billion dollars (2.3 times) to 993.0 billion dollars; the change occurred by $52.4 billion due to a population increase of 29.3 million, as well as by $507.3 billion due to an increase in GDP per capita of $1,867.0. The average annual growth of the USSR's GDP amounted to 43.0 billion dollars or 6.6%. The average annual growth of the USSR's GDP in constant prices was at the level of 5.0%. The world share decreased by 4.9%. The share in Europe decreased by 9.3%.

During 1970-1983. GDP per capita in the USSR increased by $1,867.0 (2.0 times) to $3,655.0. The average annual growth of GDP per capita at current prices is $143.6 or 5.7%.

USSR GDP, 1983-1990 (fall)

For the period 1983-1990. The USSR's GDP at current prices decreased by 202.2 billion dollars (20.4%) to 790.9 billion dollars; the change occurred by $60.0 billion due to a population increase of 16.4 million, as well as by -$262.2 billion due to a drop in GDP per capita by $910.0. The average annual GDP growth of the USSR was at the level of -28.9 billion dollars or -3.2%. The average annual growth of the USSR's GDP in constant prices was 4.2%. The world share decreased by 4.3%. The share in Europe decreased by 12.9%.

During 1983-1990. GDP per capita in the USSR increased by $910.0 (24.9%) to $2,745.0. The average annual increase in GDP per capita at current prices is -$130.0 or -4.0%.

USSR GDP, 1970

USSR GDP in 1970 it was equal to 433.4 billion dollars, ranking 2nd in the world. The share of the USSR's GDP in the world was 12.7%.

GDP per capita in the USSR in 1970 was 1,788.0 dollars, ranked 38th in the world and was at the level of GDP per capita in Puerto Rico ($1,884.0), GDP per capita in Libya ($1,865.0), GDP per capita in Brunei (1 $736.0), GDP per capita for Turks and Caicos ($1,735.0). GDP per capita in the USSR was greater than GDP per capita in the world ($924.0) by $864.0.

Comparison of the GDP of the USSR and its neighbors in 1970. The USSR's GDP was 4.7 times greater than Japan's, China's GDP ($92.6 billion) 4.7 times, India's GDP ($62.4 billion) 6.9 times, Poland's GDP ($28.3 billion) 15.3 times, Turkey's GDP ( 25.0 billion dollars) by 17.3 times, the GDP of Romania (12.7 billion dollars) by 34.1 times, the GDP of Finland (11.3 billion dollars) by 38.3 times. GDP per capita in the USSR was greater than GDP per capita in Poland ($866.0) by 2.1 times, GDP per capita in Turkey ($718.0) by 2.5 times, GDP per capita in Romania ($619.0) by 2.9 times, GDP per capita in India ($113.0) was 15.8 times, GDP per capita in China ($112.0) was 16.0 times, but was less than GDP per capita in Finland ($2,450.0) by 27%, GDP per capita in Japan ($2,026.0) by 11.7%.

Comparison of GDP of the USSR and leaders in 1970. The USSR's GDP was 2.0 times greater than Germany's GDP ($215.8 billion), Japan's GDP ($212.6 billion) was 2.0 times, France's GDP ($148.5 billion) was 2.9 times, but was less than US GDP ($1,073.3 billion) by 59.6%. GDP per capita in the USSR was less than GDP per capita in the USA ($5,121.0) by 65.1%, GDP per capita in France ($2,853.0) by 37.3%, GDP per capita in Germany ($2,747.0 ) by 34.9%, GDP per capita in Japan ($2,026.0) by 11.7%.

USSR GDP potential in 1970. With per capita GDP at the same level as the US GDP per capita ($5,121.0), the USSR's GDP would be $1,241.3 billion, which is 2.9 times the actual level. With a GDP per capita at the same level as the GDP per capita in Finland ($2,450.0), its best neighbor, the USSR's GDP would be $593.9 billion, which is 37% more than the actual level. With GDP per capita at the same level as GDP per capita in Europe ($1,966.0), the USSR's GDP would be $476.6 billion, which is 10% more than the actual level.

USSR GDP, 1983

USSR GDP in 1983 it was $993.0 billion, ranking 3rd in the world. The share of the USSR's GDP in the world was 7.7%.

GDP per capita in the USSR in 1983 was equal to $3,655.0, ranked 56th in the world and was at the level of GDP per capita in the Virgin Islands ($3,775.9), GDP per capita in Iran ($3,618.0), GDP per capita in Malta ( $3,519.0). GDP per capita in the USSR was greater than GDP per capita in the world ($2,735.0) by $920.0.

Comparison of the GDP of the USSR and its neighbors in 1983. The USSR's GDP was 3.3 times greater than China's GDP ($304.8 billion), India's GDP ($222.9 billion) 4.5 times, Turkey's GDP ($84.9 billion) 11.7 times, Poland's GDP ($78.7 billion) . dollars) by 12.6 times, the GDP of Finland (51.0 billion dollars) by 19.5 times, the GDP of Romania (47.6 billion dollars) by 20.9 times, but was less than the GDP of Japan (1,243.3 billion dollars) by 20.1%. GDP per capita in the USSR was greater than GDP per capita in Poland ($2,154.0) by 69.7%, GDP per capita in Romania ($2,077.0) by 76%, GDP per capita in Turkey ($1,804.0) ) by 2.0 times, GDP per capita in India ($298.0) by 12.3 times, GDP per capita in China ($294.0) by 12.4 times, but was less than GDP per capita in Finland ($10,483.0) by 65.1%, GDP per capita in Japan ($10,323.0) by 64.6%.

Comparison of GDP of the USSR and leaders in 1983. The USSR's GDP was greater than Germany's GDP ($770.7 billion) by 28.8%, France's GDP ($559.9 billion) by 77.4%, but was less than the US GDP ($3,634.0 billion) by 72.7% , Japan's GDP ($1,243.3 billion) by 20.1%. GDP per capita in the USSR was less than GDP per capita in the USA ($15,376.0) by 76.2%, GDP per capita in Japan ($10,323.0) by 64.6%, GDP per capita in France ($9,967.0 ) by 63.3%, GDP per capita in Germany ($9,908.0) by 63.1%.

USSR GDP potential in 1983. With per capita GDP at the same level as the US GDP per capita ($15,376.0), the USSR's GDP would be $4,177.6 billion, which is 4.2 times the actual level. With a GDP per capita at the same level as the GDP per capita of Finland ($10,483.0), its best neighbor, the USSR's GDP would be $2,848.2 billion, which is 2.9 times the actual level. With GDP per capita at the same level as GDP per capita in Europe ($5,928.0), the USSR's GDP would be $1,610.6 billion, which is 62.2% more than the actual level.

USSR GDP, 1990

USSR GDP in 1990 it was equal to 790.9 billion dollars, ranking 7th in the world. The share of the USSR's GDP in the world was 3.4%.

GDP per capita in the USSR in 1990 was 2,745.0 dollars, ranked 83rd in the world and was at the level of GDP per capita in Dominica ($2,794.0), GDP per capita in Lithuania ($2,770.0), GDP per capita in Kosovo (2,731.0 dollars), GDP per capita in Brazil ($2,724.0), GDP per capita in Cuba ($2,707.0), GDP per capita in Botswana ($2,701.0), GDP per capita in Chile ($2,637.0) , GDP per capita in Czechoslovakia ($2,626.0), GDP per capita in Mauritius ($2,590.0). GDP per capita in the USSR was less than GDP per capita in the world ($4,317.0) by $1,572.0.

Comparison of GDP of the USSR and its neighbors in 1990. The USSR's GDP was 2.0 times greater than China's GDP ($394.6 billion), India's GDP ($329.1 billion) 2.4 times, Turkey's GDP ($207.4 billion) 3.8 times, Finland's GDP ($141.4 billion) . dollars) by 5.6 times, the GDP of Poland (66.0 billion dollars) by 12.0 times, the GDP of Romania (40.6 billion dollars) by 19.5 times, but was less than the GDP of Japan (3,132.8 billion dollars) by 74.8%. GDP per capita in the USSR was greater than GDP per capita in Poland ($1,738.0) by 57.9%, GDP per capita in Romania ($1,728.0) by 58.9%, GDP per capita in India ($378.0) by 7.3 times, GDP per capita in China ($337.0) by 8.1 times, but was less than GDP per capita in Finland ($28,310.0) by 90.3%, GDP per capita in Japan ($25,160.0) by 89.1%, GDP per capita in Turkey ($3,847.0) by 28.6%.

Comparison of GDP of the USSR and leaders in 1990. The USSR's GDP was less than the US GDP ($5,963.1 billion) by 86.7%, Japan's GDP ($3,132.8 billion) by 74.8%, Germany's GDP ($1,771.6 billion) by 55.4%, France's GDP ($1,269.1 billion) by 37.7%, Italian GDP ($1,176.4 billion) by 32.8%. GDP per capita in the USSR was less than GDP per capita in Japan ($25,160.0) by 89.1%, GDP per capita in the USA ($23,614.0) by 88.4%, GDP per capita in Germany ($22,392.0 ) by 87.7%, GDP per capita in France ($21,685.0) by 87.3%, GDP per capita in Italy ($20,593.0) by 86.7%.

USSR GDP potential in 1990. With a GDP per capita at the same level as the GDP per capita of Finland ($28,310.0), its best neighbor, the USSR's GDP would be $8,156.4 billion, which is 10.3 times the actual level. With per capita GDP at the same level as Japan's per capita GDP ($25,160.0), the USSR's GDP would be $7,248.9 billion, which is 9.2 times the actual level. With GDP per capita at the same level as GDP per capita in Europe ($12,086.0), the USSR's GDP would be $3,482.1 billion, which is 4.4 times the actual level. With GDP per capita at the same level as GDP per capita in the world ($4,317.0), the USSR's GDP would be $1,243.8 billion, which is 57.3% more than the actual level. With a GDP per capita at the same level as the GDP per capita in Eastern Europe ($2,948.0), the USSR's GDP would be $849.4 billion, which is 7.4% more than the actual level.

Picture. USSR GDP, 1970-1990

Picture. GDP per capita in the USSR, 1970-1990

Picture. GDP growth in the USSR, 1970-1990

USSR GDP by expenditure

Russia has had to endure many difficult trials; its history is truly dramatic. Over the past hundred years, Russia has had to endure a whole series of regional conflicts, two world wars, and the Cold War. As a result of these events and their consequences, the world witnessed the collapse of two established government systems in our country and colossal geopolitical and economic changes. There were losses of territory and reunification, retreats on political fronts and resounding victories in world political arenas, financial and economic crises and periods of incredible growth.

Today, any responsible citizen of Russia has questions: What has modern Russia acquired as a result of numerous reforms? How effective is modern Russia compared to Russia during the Soviet Union? What is the future of the new Russia?

To answer these questions, we conducted a comparative analysis of the most important indicators of Russia's development during two periods of its history - as a federal republic (RSFSR) within the Soviet Union during the restoration after the Great Patriotic War from 1945 to 1960 and the formation of the independent Russian Federation (RF ) after the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1995 to 2010. The year 1995 was taken for the study, not 1991, to give the new Russia a slight head start, because the results of the end of World War II and the Cold War were different. In 1945, destructive forces were absent, the Soviet Union expanded its borders and influence in the world, which contributed to the rapid start of economic growth. After the fall of the Union, inertial forces began to operate and continued until 1998. On the other hand, it would be unfair to give the Russian Federation too much of a head start over the RSFSR, since the government had a chance to turn the situation around and take advantage of the advantages of a market economy back in the middle of the last decade.

What have we lost?

To understand what Russia gained from 1945 to 1960 and from 1995 to 2010, one must first understand what it lost.

During the war years (1941-1945), almost 27 million people died in the USSR (the RSFSR lost about 14 million), millions became disabled. In the RSFSR, 1,710 cities and large urban-type settlements were destroyed, and in some of them there were practically no surviving buildings. About 71 thousand villages were burned. 30 thousand industrial enterprises, tens of thousands of bridges and crossings, hundreds of thousands of railways and highways were destroyed. During the war, the entire economy was adjusted to military needs. As a result of losses of population, enterprises and all kinds of infrastructure, the GDP of the territories liberated from occupation fell by more than 30% (Fig. 1). But thanks to the incredible courage of every liberating soldier and every home front worker, the GDP of the entire country decreased by an average of 14% compared to 1940.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, losses turned out to be no less impressive, and in some ways much more serious. The population of Russia during this period changed insignificantly, unlike other indicators - by only 4.4%, but a comparison of the level of GDP in PPP gives a depressing picture. In 1991, GDP at PPP in the RSFSR exceeded 1.9 billion US dollars (at the time of its collapse, the USSR had a GDP of 3.1 billion, and a few years earlier - 3.5 billion). In 1995, GDP at PPP in the Russian Federation was only 1.25 billion, i.e. loss 34.2%.

Rice. 1 Russia's losses after the Great Patriotic War and the collapse of the USSR

It turns out that after the war the RSFSR had a much more stable position in economic, geopolitical and military terms, without taking into account demographics. This is not surprising, because the USSR ended the war with victory, and the Russian Federation clearly lost from the collapse of the Union.

What did we buy?

Note that the dynamics of the country’s economic development were studied using average values, because There are a huge number of sources giving different figures. During the Soviet Union, such a difference was due primarily to propaganda tendencies, as well as the closed nature of the Soviet system - the USSR officially published GDP data only in 1989.

Gross domestic product

The average GDP growth in the RSFSR from 1945 to 1950 was 9.11% (the national average is about 14.7%). Such high growth was ensured, despite numerous difficulties and famine, due to the initially sharp positive impulse after the victory, the free labor force of millions of prisoners of war and convicts, the “dividends” from the Great Victory and all its derivatives. Throughout the country, the growth was even higher, because First of all, there was an active restoration of the liberated and most destroyed territories. The average growth of the Russian Federation's GDP from 1995 to 2000 is 1.81%. This is due to the continuation of the inertial economic decline, the 1998 crisis and, perhaps most importantly, the inability of the government to reverse the situation.

The period from 1951 to 1960 shows an average growth of 5.81%, from 2001 to 2010 - 5.07% (taking into account the consensus forecast for Russian GDP growth in 2010 of about 5%). At the same time, in 2009, GDP fell by 7.9% due to the strong impact of the global financial crisis on the fragile economy, the withdrawal of foreign capital (including due to the August 2008 war), a decrease in business activity, and a drop in indicators of confidence in the business community and the entire population of Russia. It should be taken into account that due to a sharp reduction in the level of consumption and business activity, many goods ceased to be sold, and there was a huge accumulation of them in warehouses. Once confidence is restored, all this will be immediately sold out and we can expect a speedy economic recovery.

Let us display on the graph (Fig. 2) the GDP growth for the periods under consideration to the beginning of these periods, i.e. for the RSFSR by 1945, and for the Russian Federation by 1995.

Rice. 2 GDP growth of the RSFSR and the Russian Federation by the beginning of the period

By the end of 1960, compared to 1945, GDP in the RSFSR increased by 271% (while the GDP of the entire USSR, according to various sources, averaged about 450%). The growth of the Russian Federation's GDP from 1995 to the end of 2010 is estimated at 175.5%.

However, it is important to understand that measuring the quantitative indicator of GDP is based on the assumption that product quality and competitiveness are constant parameters. This is not the case in the real economy. In order to measure the real strength of a state’s economic development, it is necessary to measure the growth of GDP per capita (Fig. 3).

Rice. 3 GDP per capita growth by the beginning of the period (1945/1995)

The results of the comparative analysis were unexpected: the RSFSR and the Russian Federation developed in a similar way according to this indicator. Moreover, the growth rate over the past ten years has been higher than during the times of the RSFSR: the annual increase averaged 5.21%, while from 1950 to 1960 this figure was 4.35%. In 2010, the level of GDP per capita will increase by more than 5% by the end of the year.

Thus, we can draw a very important conclusion: the development of the economy of the RSFSR, when recalculated for each individual citizen, proceeded at a similar pace as the development of the economy of the Russian Federation.

However, although the growth rates of GDP per capita were approximately the same, and the growth of GDP itself from 1945 to 1960 was higher, the modern Russian citizen is still more than twice as rich as in 1960.

The data presented in Fig. 4 clearly show the relationship between the size of the economy and GDP per capita in 1960 and in 2010 when converted to 2009 US dollars.

Rice. 4. Comparison of Russian economic indicators in 1960 and 2010. when converted to 2009 US dollars:

4a —GDP volume

4b - GDP per capita

But there is one more advantage over Soviet times. In addition to the fact that modern Russians have higher purchasing power, today there is no shortage of goods in Russia, and even more so there is no shortage of food products. And this is a very significant plus.

In this article we will not consider all the causes of shortages in the RSFSR and abundance in the Russian Federation. In short, the point is the colossal difference in economic volumes. Despite the years of devastation in the 1990s, Russia's GDP in 2010 significantly exceeds the GDP of 1960 (Fig. 4 a)). In other words, to feed the Russian Federation in 1960, it was necessary to allocate about 4% of GDP to solve food problems; in 2010, no more than 1.6% is required for the same needs. The higher volume of the food sector in the Russian Federation explains the abundance of food products. The situation is similar with other products and services that were in short supply during Soviet times.

Structure of the Russian economy

In fact, the economic structure that modern Russia has was laid down in the 50s of the last century. It was in the late 1950s that the Soviet Union began to create the basis for a resource-based economy, and in the 1960s one of its main goals was to consolidate its status as an energy superpower. However, Western countries vigorously opposed this and the process dragged on for decades. This task has been successfully completed by modern Russia.

When comparing the structure of economies in 1960 and 2010 (Figure 5), we should not forget that the size of economies has changed significantly. In 2010, GDP approximately corresponds in volume to 1990, but it is many times greater than the GDP of 1960 in absolute value. So, if in 1960 mining accounted for 5.1% of the country’s GDP, in 2010 this industry already occupies 7.87%. At the same time, oil production increased by 238.3%, and gas production by 7458.5%.

Also, do not forget that the oil and gas industry consists of more than just production and overall accounts for about 25% of GDP in 2010.

Rice. 5 Economic structure:

5a — RSFSR 1960

5 B - RF 2010.

The volume of exports as a whole in 2010 exceeds the volume of exports in 1960 by a little more than 5 times. The volume of oil exports (excluding petroleum products and natural gas) in 2010 was 7.5 times higher than in 1960 (Fig. 6).

Rice. 6 Increase in exports of the Russian Federation in 2010 in relation to the RSFSR in 1960.

Thus, there is a dependence of modern Russia on the export of raw materials. The course taken by the government to modernize the Russian economy has so far had minimal effect. It will be possible to talk about any significant results from the start of modernization no earlier than 2015, while the modernization itself will be able to clearly manifest itself only by 2020. By this time, the currently unacceptably small volume of electronics production will have to increase tenfold. Civil and military shipbuilding and, in particular, aircraft manufacturing raise certain hopes. There must be a qualitative leap in the production of space technology. Predicting the domestic automotive industry is a thankless task, but we can expect an increase in the production of cars of foreign brands in the Russian Federation. The emergence of Moscow as an international financial center is likely. But these are all just forecasts and hopes. Let's see how these things stood in the period 1945-1960. and 1995-2010

The development of industry, especially heavy industry, was a key direction for the USSR. Therefore, it is not surprising that by 1948 industrial production volumes exceeded pre-war levels.

The USSR made enormous efforts and achieved incredible results: more than 14.2 thousand large enterprises were built; The volumes of the chemical and petrochemical industries grew in 1945-1960. by more than 660%; Oil production increased by 650%, gas - by 1250%, coal - by 235%. The output volumes of mechanical engineering and metalworking are almost 600%. Steel and cast iron production increased by 430%, from 12.3 million and 8.8 million to 65.3 million and 46.8 million, respectively. At the same time, the share of heavy industry in the USSR economy grew steadily. So, in 1945 it was 60.0%, and light - 40%; in 1950 - already 68.8% against 31.2%, by 1960 - 72.5% against 27.5%. Due to mechanization and the first stages of automation in industrial production, labor productivity increased by 50% from 1945 to 1950, and by 200% from 1945 to 1960.

The results of such impressive results in comparison with the results of modern Russia are presented below.

Rice. 7. Growth in industrial production volumes

Of course, in the current era, industry is not growing at such an impressive pace, but comparing industry growth rates in percentage terms is not entirely correct. Firstly, although the end of industrialization is generally called 1940, in terms of the ratio of industrial production volumes to other sectors of the economy, the RSFSR reached it only in 1960.

The growth dynamics of the share of industry in total GDP is shown in Fig. 8.

Rice. 8 Industrial development coefficient

The coefficient of industrial development dynamics is the ratio of GDP growth to industrial growth. This coefficient shows the growth dynamics of other sectors of the economy in relation to industry.

In 1960, the share of industrial production in the country's GDP was approximately 55%, and subsequently this figure reached 60-70%, while in the modern economy this figure does not exceed 40% (in 2009 it was 37%). However, the share of industry in relation to other sectors is not an indicator of the standard of living of citizens and the competitiveness of the state. Overall, the 37% figure is higher than that of most Western countries, but Russia's standard of living and per capita GDP still lag behind those of its Euro-Atlantic competitors.

In 1945, Russia was still significantly behind in the number of cars, civil aircraft, etc. It is therefore not surprising that their growth was exponential until 1960. Not to mention rocket and space technology, which, by and large, did not exist before the 1950s.

The growth of consumer goods lagged significantly behind the growth of industry as a whole. This is explained by the fact that with planned command management of the economy, all production was divided into two main groups: “A” - production of means of production and “B” - consumer goods. The production of group "A" proceeded at an accelerated pace, since the militarized, industrially oriented economy of the RSFSR constantly required a high level of development of group "A". Such a distribution does not mean at all that the production of means of production is a pure investment in the future of the country, i.e. future exponential growth in the number of products produced. Otherwise, the USSR would have overtaken all countries of the world in production, including the USA by 1980. That did not happen. At the same time, the shortage of consumer goods invariably remained in the Soviet Union.

In modern Russia, the production of consumer goods has decreased to an indecently low level - 1.35% (versus 8.50% in 1960), light industrial goods are imported in large volumes.

We will not compare production volumes of military equipment. The USSR was a militarized state, which not only set the task of catching up and overtaking the United States, but was also constantly preparing for a new world war.

As for the production of civil equipment (airplanes and aircraft equipment, ships, buses, trucks, cars, tractors and other agricultural equipment, refrigerators and other household appliances), the growth rate here was lower than the growth rate of industry as a whole. At the same time, the growth for individual units of production in different periods was different. For example, the number of agricultural tractors produced has been falling since 1995, and from 2006 to 2008. In the Russian Federation, the production of tractors has almost doubled - from 6,500 to 12,500. At the same time, the use of some other agricultural machinery is growing, and yields are increasing.

At the same time, consumption of other products, for example, cars, is growing. If we compare the level of motorization of the RSFSR and the Russian Federation, it is necessary to take into account that in the RSFSR the transport issue was resolved primarily through state and public transport. In the 1940-1950s, there were practically no passenger cars on sale. Therefore, for a correct comparison, an analysis of the level of motorization in Russia during the period 1945-1960. made taking into account state passenger and public transport, and in the period 1995-2010. taking into account only private cars.

According to the results of our study, the level of motorization increased by 2.4 times from 1945 to 1960, while from 1995 to 2010 it increased by almost 2.8 times. Average increase in 1945-1950 amounted to 6.15% per year, and in 1951-1960. - 5.35%. Against 7.49% and 6.13% in the periods 1995-2000. and 2001-2010 respectively.

Analysis of the harvest of grain crops in Russia during the periods under review gives a positive picture (Fig. 9). A well-structured food security policy is bearing fruit. Despite the horrific drought of 2010, which Russia has not seen for more than a hundred years, grain harvest remains at a very high level.

Rice. 9. Harvesting grain crops in Russia

Labor productivity in Russia remains lower than in the most developed countries, but very high growth rates of this indicator are observed (Figure 10). The Russian Federation is ahead of the RSFSR both in terms of the average level of labor productivity and the dynamics of growth of this indicator in all sectors of the economy, especially in agriculture and the services sector. At the same time, the Russian Federation demonstrates a higher level of labor productivity in industry, both in absolute terms and in terms of growth rates.

Rice. 10. Labor productivity growth in Russia:

10a — in industrial production

10b — generally

Demographic component

Modern Russia has missed one of the most important factors of development - population growth. The demographic crisis has already had very serious consequences and has an economic expression that can be defined as the failure to receive 95.8% of GDP growth. Russia is in dire need of a demographic boom, which would inevitably entail additional economic growth for the entire country.

From 1991 to the mid-2000s there was a dramatic population decline. However, the process was stopped, and since 2003-2004 there has been a decrease in mortality. A little earlier - in 1999 - the process of increasing birth rates began again. Migration also shows positive trends. There is every reason to believe that in the next year or two the population of Russia will again begin to grow steadily, and by 2020 the growth rate can probably be called a boom.

The analysis shows that for the period from 1945 to 1960. The average life expectancy in Russia was 57.2 years, from 1995 to 2010. — 66.3 years. The dynamics of the increase in life expectancy from 1945 to 1946 is explained by the end of the war. This is followed by a sharp decline due to the famine of 1946-1947. By the end of the 1960s, due to the rapid development of the country, life expectancy reached an average of 63-67.5 years. By the end of the 2010s, this figure was 66.7-68 years.

Thus, characterizing the quality of life (without taking into account the level of comfort and accessibility of modern high technologies) by its duration, we can draw the following conclusion. Life in the modern Russian Federation in 1995-2010. better life in Soviet Russia 1945-1960. on average by 15.9%.

Development potential

If you compare the most significant indicators of the country’s level of development for the last year of the periods under review, you can get a clear idea of ​​the dynamics of the country’s development and its potential.

Table 1. Indicators of the level and potential of state development

* - Indicative coefficient - the relative ratio of the evaluation criteria of the Russian Federation and the RSFSR. It is calculated as the ratio of the best parameter to the worst. So, for example, when assessing the level of corruption, the best indicator is a parameter equal to 0.02 for the RSFSR, and the worst is 0.3 for the Russian Federation, while when assessing the level of motorization, 240 for the Russian Federation will be the best parameter.

As the study shows, the Russian Federation outperforms the RSFSR by 2.17 times according to a wide range of comparison criteria. I must admit that when starting the analysis, I assumed that modern Russia would only be able to boast a higher level of freedoms, an emerging civil society, and some other not so significant advantages. However, the results were very encouraging and strengthened faith in the enormous development potential of Russia.

The economy of the USSR was founded during the period of industrialization before 1940 and in the post-war period in 1945-1960. It was during this period that the USSR demonstrated the most rapid growth rates. And although, by inertia, the Soviet Union continued to develop for another 20 years, reaching its peak in the 1970s, as a result the state suffered a systemic failure. The USSR fell under pressure primarily from itself. One of the most important reasons was the stagnation of the economy, founded in the period 1945-1960. Comfort, freedom and people's lives were sacrificed to progress.

The fall lasted a long time and dragged on until 1998. But Russia began to rise again above all difficulties.

We paid a heavy price in the 1940s and 1950s to lay the foundations of industry, and in the 1990s for civil liberties. And only now does modern Russia have a truly wonderful opportunity to create a strong, prosperous Power.

Materials used in the article:

Interview with Gennady Petrovich Chizhov, Deputy Director of Marketing of PKF Tiras LLC and President of the South Ukrainian Center for Ethnic and Political Studies "LAD". Magazine "Real EstateM" No. 30 dated July 30, 2009

The national economy of the USSR over 70 years. Anniversary statistical yearbook // M.: "Finance and Statistics M, 1987

Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the Armed Forces: A Statistical Study. Under the guidance of Grigory Krivosheev, consultant of the Military Memorial Center of the Russian Armed Forces, 1993.

Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century / Ed. by Colonel-General G.F. Krivosheev. London: Greenhill Books, 1997.

Federal State Statistics Service.

Estimated value. According to the USSR State Statistics Committee - 1.6 trillion. rubles, which corresponds, according to various estimates, to approximately 2.7-3.4 billion dollars (in 2009 dollars). "POLICY" No. 47(508) dated 12/18/2006. According to the CIA Factbook - approximately $2.53 billion (in 2009 dollars) until the collapse of the USSR. According to Boris Ikhlov (KPRF.Ru) in 1990 - 3325 billion dollars (in 2003 dollars). The issue of the volume of the USSR's GDP remains the most controversial.

According to the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), CIA Factbook, IMF.

Estimated value. The national economy of the USSR over 70 years. Anniversary statistical yearbook // M.: "Finance and Statistics", 1987. 1. History of the USSR. Edited by Ostrovsky V.P. - M., 1990. Kara-Murza S. History of the Soviet state and law. Russia and the world. Edited by Danilov A. A. - M., 1994. Geoffrey Hosking. History of the Soviet Union. 1917-1991. - M., 1994. TSB, third edition. 1969-1978. A.V. Poletaev GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN COMPARISON WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1960-2004. Moscow. State University Higher School of Economics. 2006.

According to the Federal State Statistics Service.

TSB, third edition. 1969-1978

Alexey Shumkov, teacher at Samara State Aerospace University, Ph.D.

From time to time you come across beautiful graphs and plates showing the ratio of GDP growth rates of the USSR to, say, Western countries. Depending on the political orientation of the author, graphs and figures serve as “weighty” evidence of one point of view or another, essentially promoting the author’s ideological corpuscle. The left-patriotic part of the public likes to point out the high rates of economic growth of the Stalin period (and more broadly, the 20-60s), and their opponents, not without pleasure, point to the low rates of the 80s. Both camps are mistaken, and this misunderstanding is due to gaps in modern economic knowledge.

Declaration. I want to say right away that I am not going to develop arguments in favor of this or that point of view. Personally, I don't care whether the rate of economic development was actually high or low. It couldn't be otherwise, because I would be biased. When I started writing this text, I had practically no idea about it, i.e. I didn’t know what would come out. And the result, of course, cannot be simple and unambiguous simply because reality is complex enough to allow unambiguous interpretations.

Before we begin to analyze the growth rate of a country, we must understand how economic growth occurs in the first place. To do this, you need to understand how the value we are talking about changing - GDP - is formed.

GDP (national output) is the volume of final products produced in a country over a certain period. To produce output, it is necessary to spend factors of production (labor, capital, raw materials), using a set of available production technologies.

It follows that GDP can change only if at least one of these factors has changed: the country’s population has grown, more capital has appeared, production and service technologies have improved, etc. In principle, miracles do not happen: in order for something to grow on the left side of the ratio, something must first change on the right.

There may be different ways to describe the interaction of these factors and derive GDP dynamics from them. But the most successful at the moment is the description according to which the GDP growth rate consists of the following components:

grY = n + g + t,

Where grY- GDP growth rate ( Y), n- population growth rate, g- rate of growth of “knowledge” and t- some kind of transitive dynamics.

From here it immediately follows

Why? Yes, because any economy at any given time grows at least at the rate of population growth. And if we are trying to find the philosopher’s stone/evidence of the economic miracle in the USSR, then we must make a correction for what is already growing, without any effort.

This should always be done when we are talking about increasing the standard of living in a country (per capita indicators) and when comparing the rate of improvement in living standards in different countries.

The second unknown in our relationship is some kind of transitive dynamics. What is this?

Roughly speaking, in the long run the economic growth rate converges to a steady-state value of only n + g. But this is in the long term. And if the economy began its growth at a point distant from this state, then it will approach it with an absolutely decreasing difference in growth rates from the stable one ( n+g). This divergence is captured by the transitive dynamics of t.

What causes this transitive dynamic? It is caused by changes in capital (in terms of labor and the level of technology). If there is too little capital in the economy, it will grow until its volume reaches a sustainable level. In this case, there will be a significant (short-term) transitive dynamics in the growth rate of GDP per capita (and capital per capita). Sooner or later, the transitive dynamics will still become negligible - I repeat, these are only short-term influences.

this implies

Lesson 2: The impact of capital growth must be taken into account

If we want to make a meaningful comparison of two (or more) countries, then it is necessary to make an adjustment for starting conditions - did they start with relatively equal amounts of capital per labor, do they have the same other parameters, where are they located relative to their long-term coordinates.

Remaining unknown g- this is the growth of some “knowledge”. In fact, this includes all other factors that increase the productivity of labor and capital.

There are many such factors and they can be identified. For example, you can take into account the growth in the level of education of the population (introduce human capital into consideration). It is clear that if the population has a low level of literacy, as in the Russian Empire, then the introduction of universal secondary education and the spread of universities will have a tangible effect on labor productivity. True, the effect is one-time, because the prevalence of even higher education in the population cannot be raised above 100%.

The most important component g However, the level of knowledge in society is the level of technology. It is believed that technology is largely freely available and that all countries contribute to its emergence. For example, all countries have access to research in molecular biology or thermodynamics. Thus, the growth of the global level of knowledge is an external process and - within the framework of considering an individual small country - poorly controlled.

this implies

If the countries of the world are growing at a certain general rate of growth of knowledge, then there is no merit if we are growing at this rate. On the contrary, our comparative success can only be determined in relation to the growth of everyone else. Those. If our productivity is growing faster than the world average, then we're doing great. And if not, then there is no reason to be proud (of other people’s efforts, in fact).

So, let's summarize. We started with “gross” GDP growth values. It turned out that from these values ​​it is necessary to subtract the population growth rate, the global trend, and even take into account transitive dynamics. It is also good to take into account the growth in the level of education of the population and the emancipation of women (=which acts in the same way as the one-time growth of the economically active population).

What remains in the end after these subtractions is the desired “economic miracle”. What no one expected from us, but we did. Was it there?

Let us now turn to the real data of the USSR.

First, let's look at how the GNP growth rate and the labor growth rate behave. Here's the chart:

(ld_GNPWEST - GNP growth rate; ld_LWEST - labor growth rate)

It is clear to the naked eye that at least until the 50s. a significant part of the growth rate of GNP is caused by population growth. The growth rate of GNP per capita is the difference between the two lines on the graph. To get an idea of ​​the rate of economic development of the USSR, one should first adjust the figures down for the entire period by the value of the population growth rate.

Here is the adjusted graph (GNP per capita growth rate):

In principle, the growth rate is quite high, although volatile at the beginning of the series, the average value is somewhere around 3-5% per year. But let’s not rush to conclusions; we still have a number of factors that have not been taken into account.

Let's plot the growth of GNP per capita and capital per capita:

(gyperl - growth rate of GNP per capita; gkperl - growth rate of capital per capita)

It turns out that most of the time capital grew faster than GNP, especially in the second half of the period under review. Curious.

(ld_wrld - world GDP per capita growth rate)

The global growth of knowledge “eats up” almost all achievements after the mid-70s. and about half before this period. There is uncertainty about the 60s, when the per capita growth rate in the USSR was significantly higher.

Now let's try to put everything together. There is, however, a nuance here. To isolate an “economic miracle” from the indicated factors, you need to know the production function. In what follows I use a simple assumption (Cobb-Douglas with elasticity 1/2), but its usefulness is questioned. However, given the available (unsatisfactory) volume of statistics for the USSR, it is difficult to determine the production function in a convincing way. Glory to the State Statistics Committee of the USSR! And glory to the State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation! So this topic is still waiting for its archivist researcher. We will focus on a rough assumption.

Here is a growth rate chart that takes into account population growth, global knowledge, and capital:

And this does not take into account changes in human capital!

Apart from the obvious anomaly immediately after the war (it needs to be dealt with separately, most likely it is due to the discrepancy in time in the introduction of fixed assets), it turns out that for almost the entire period the remainder in the growth rate of the USSR GNP per capita was negative, i.e. there was no economic miracle at all.

This, of course, does not mean that the economic policy of the USSR was a failure. In the end, a result slightly worse than average is also a result. But, apparently, it is not entirely correct to talk about an economic miracle. However, I got carried away, it's time to call it a day.

I refer everyone interested in a professional presentation of these exciting ideas to literature. First of all

Robert Solow (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65, pp. 65-94.

Alwyn Young (1995). The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 3, pp. 641-680.

N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer, and David N. Weil. A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2):407-437, May 1992.

William Easterly and Stanley Fischer (1994). The Soviet Economic Decline: Historical and Republican Data. World Bank Policy Research Working paper 1281.

Moses Abramovitz and Paul A. David (1973). Reinterpreting Economic Growth: Parables and Realities. American Economic Review, 63, 2, pp. 428-439.

Jonathan Temple. The new growth evidence. Journal of Economic Literature,
37(1):112-156, March 1999.

Roemer, Michael. (1996). Could Asian policies propel African growth? HIID Working Paper 543

Source data and an alternative view on the same topic are taken from here:

There's a link on the right Related dataset.

P.S. There are a number of subtleties and problems that, in principle, can be discussed, but a detailed presentation of which would burden the text even more.
P.S.S. This is not yet a reason to shout that everything was supposedly bad in the economy. Here, again, there are a number of difficulties that are best discussed separately. Here's a summary of sorts:

Generally speaking, the growth rate of GDP per capita in the USSR was even higher, on average over 60 years, than in the United States (about 2.7% versus 2% per year). The problem is that economic growth in the United States has been relatively flat (except for the Great Depression).

In the USSR, there was high growth in the initial period, due to increased literacy (to which there is a natural physical limit) and saturation with capital (to which there is also a limit - diminishing returns). Taking these influences into account, the rate of development of the Soviet economy was worse than the world average, except for a few short periods of time.

Sooner or later, this was bound to have an impact and did so in the final period, when the growth rate of GDP per capita equaled the growth rate of productivity (which was low compared to the global background), and the influence of other temporary sources was exhausted.

The economy of the USSR is the second largest economy in the world in terms of GDP (after the US economy) in the territory of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, producing 1/5 of the world's industrial output. The USSR economy was the first centrally planned economy in history, which was carried out by three state institutions:
Gosplan of the USSR - State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Planning
State Bank of the USSR - State Bank
Gossnab of the USSR - State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Material and Technical Supply Before the October Revolution of 1917, Russia lagged significantly behind the industrialized capitalist states. In terms of industrial production, it ranked 5th in the world and 4th in Europe.

The first major state planning project was the GOELRO plan, followed by five-year plans - “five-year plans”. The main emphasis of economic planning was placed on the rapid development in a short time of heavy industry to the detriment of the development of other sectors of consumption, as a result of which, within a few years from the start of planning, the USSR turned into one of the largest industrial-agrarian powers in the world. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was of great importance in the further development of the state's economy. Thanks to the greatest efforts of the people, the Soviet Union managed, less than 10 years after the end of the destructive war, to restore its position in the world economy and subsequently take a leading position in many indicators. Already by the 1960s, the economy of the USSR occupied 1st place in the world in: coal mining, iron ore mining, coke and cement production, production of diesel locomotives, production of lumber, woolen fabrics, granulated sugar and animal oil, etc. Second place in the world - the production of all industrial products, electricity, oil and gas production, the production of steel, cast iron, chemical products, mineral fertilizers, mechanical engineering products, cotton fabrics, etc. Subsequently, the USSR overtook its world competitors in the production of steel, cast iron, oil production, production of mineral fertilizers, reinforced concrete structures, shoes, etc. A distinctive feature of the economy in the late history of the Soviet Union is the shortage of consumer goods, which is explained by imperfect processes in terms of pricing and soft monetary policy, which worsened during the perestroika period. In the mid-1980s, the leadership of the Soviet Union attempted to rebuild the Soviet way of economic management with the introduction of elements of the free market - a mixed economy. However, by the 1990s, the Soviet Government lost control over the state's economy as a result of a number of reasons, which resulted in the country accelerating the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The basis of the economic system of the USSR is socialist ownership of the means of production. It arose and was established as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 and the building of socialism in the USSR. The working class, in alliance with the working peasantry under the leadership of the Communist Party, abolished the political power of the bourgeoisie and landowners; By nationalizing and socializing the main means of production in the most important sectors of the national economy, he gained economic positions in the country. Relying on socialist ownership in these crucial areas of the economy, the working class, under the leadership of the Communist Party, transformed small-scale peasant farming into large-scale socialist farming through cooperation. Small private peasant property was replaced by large socialist collective farm-cooperative property. As a result, by the mid-30s. socialist property in two forms - state and collective farm-cooperative - has become undividedly dominant in the country's economy

This led to a radical change in the purpose of production, which began to be determined by the basic economic law of socialism - ensuring the well-being and comprehensive development of all members of society through the most complete satisfaction of their constantly growing material and cultural needs, achieved through the continuous growth and improvement of societies. production based on scientific and technological progress. This law expresses the fundamental advantages of the Soviet socialist economy over the capitalist economy, the goal of which is the pursuit of the greatest profit. Socialist ownership of the means of production gives scope for the development of productive forces, because the socialist relations of production based on it are fully consistent with their character. A socialist economy, unlike a capitalist one, develops systematically, without crises or recessions. This ensures stable and high growth rates of the entire national economy. A socialist economy has the possibility of concentrating production and deepening the division of societies, not limited by the framework of private property. labor through specialization and cooperation, which contributes to rapid growth in the productivity of societies. labor - the main condition for the victory of the new society. building over the old one.

Socialist property and the operation of the economic law of planned, proportional development of the national economy opened up for the first time in the history of society the opportunity to develop the entire national economy according to a single state plan. A centrally planned economy provides advantages such as the concentration of resources in critical areas of societies. production, proportional development of the national economy. Planfulness makes it possible to better, more fully and efficiently use society's resources - material, monetary and labor, and, first of all, to solve problems of national importance. The Soviet state maintains constant proportionality throughout the entire national economy, strictly taking into account the needs of society and the resources it has, applying knowledge of the laws of societies. development, guided by Marxist-Leninist theory. On the basis of scientific foresight through planning, the Soviet state is improving the structure of social production.

The management of the national economy is carried out on the basis of democratic centralism, which presupposes the participation of the working masses in this process through state elected bodies, public organizations, production meetings held at every enterprise, etc., a nationwide discussion of national economic plans, allowing the discovery and use of production reserves. Counter plans that contribute to the development of the creative potential and energy of the people are also a form of mass participation of workers in planning and managing the national economy.

The driving force behind the country's economic development was mass socialist competition, the opposite of capitalist competition, which divides people and is inextricably linked with anarchy and the spontaneous nature of capitalist production. Socialist competition increases the consciousness and patriotism of workers in the interests of further rapid economic development, increased production efficiency, and labor productivity.

The Soviet economy is characterized by the socialist principle of distribution according to labor (according to its quantity and quality - qualifications). Personal and collective material interest in the results of labor stimulates the growth of productivity and production at every workplace, enterprise, and throughout society.

The planned development of the economy ensures the rational placement of production. forces throughout the country. During the years of Soviet power, radical changes took place in the distribution of production. forces associated with the growth of industrial production in the Union republics and the general promotion of production to the eastern regions of the country, rich in natural resources of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, coal, oil and gas, forests, and hydropower.

Why was America ahead of the USSR in terms of GDP, but behind the USSR in terms of overall production by the mid-80s?

The model used for GDP adjustments is good for Western economies, but bad for planned economies; GDP is mainly an indicator of consumption, not real production.
In the West, and especially in the United States, during the Cold War, a very active and professionally well-selected and trained school of comparative Sovietologists developed, which supplied the public with false information about the Soviet economy, comparable to the corresponding information on the US economy.
These “economists” monopolized and crushed the most important thing for themselves - the very understanding of economic efficiency. And now, many years later, economists are breeding who do not even have doubts about this. Comparing planned and market economies with the GDP indicator can either be saboteurs to exaggerate the power of the United States over the USSR, or simply idiots. In addition to the current would-be economists of Russia and the CIA analysts serving the order of the Washington Regional Committee, current Russian textbooks are also replete with statements about the low growth rates of the USSR.
Let's take a closer look...GDP was generally less than the American one because:
In the USSR, the service sector played a much smaller role in the economy than in the US market;
Prices in the USSR for services and goods were lower than in the USA;
There was no private investment in the USSR.

For example, in 1986, the US GDP was, according to the CIA, 3.9 trillion. dollars. 2.18 trillion - 65% of which was consumption - services and goods at market prices. Of the 121 million US labor force, 80 million people (66%) worked in the service sector
The GDP of the Soviet Union, according to the CIA, was 2.06 trillion. 50% consisted of consumption. Of the USSR labor force of 128 million people, about 55 million people (42%) worked in the public services sector.

GDP shows only the total value of goods and services purchased, not their quantity. And the difference in consumption of 65% of the USA and 50% of the USSR is, to a greater extent, a difference in their total cost than in quantity. State services of the USSR, not only were there fewer of them, were cheaper than those of American private traders who received fees by setting their own prices, when in the USSR workers received a set salary from the state. Some services in the USSR were free for consumers, such as medical, educational, etc. It should be borne in mind that the salaries of workers in the USSR cannot show the total number of services they provided. Example: if a dentist in a public clinic serves 10,000 clients in a year, he receives a set salary, while a private one will charge everyone a fee and receive a huge amount of money, which will be counted in the American GDP. In the USSR, everything was produced not for profit, as in the USA, but to maximally satisfy the needs of the population, at the lowest possible price, and the quality was in many ways approximately equal.
Now private investment is 501 billion of the US GDP in 1985, when there simply was none in the USSR.
It is also known that 15% of the US GDP consists of rent paid by homeowners to themselves. These figures have nothing to do with development, only with the level of rental prices. However, they are counted in GDP, and it is because of this that the US GDP exceeds the GDP of so many countries.
If an expensive product or service is sold at a reduced price, then the GDP growth rate is underestimated. Including rent in calculations increases economic growth rates. These indicators were counted in the US GDP and were not counted in the USSR GDP. The growth of today's Russia is largely due to the growth of property rents.
Back in the late 1980s. Soviet economists Selyunin and Khanin published a number of articles in which they convincingly showed that behind the growth of such cost indicators as GDP, a decline in production is often hidden if it is presented in natural (physical) indicators.
For example, if prostitution and drug trafficking were legalized, the official GDP of the United States would increase by approximately $500 billion without any increase in production or consumption values.
Leading Western expert on the Soviet economy, Alex Nove, who is well acquainted with the peculiarities of the USSR economy, believes that recalculating and comparing GDP or GNP in economies of different types using price indicators is unlawful.

Most competent economists understand that the USSR developed normally. No crisis phenomena inherent in this system were discovered until 1986.

Attempts to belittle the economic achievements of the USSR are intended to prove that the collapse of the USSR was inevitable and that there is no point in restoring what collapsed on its own. Meanwhile, the scientific community of the West is not as homogeneous in its assessments as the current Russian manipulators of science, who resort to pseudoscientific methods of processing statistical indicators, protecting themselves from criticism by the high authority of science.